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This article began as an investigation of delegation of power
doctrine as it has been applied to the standards used in zoning
ordinances. In the face of the decreasing importance of delegation
problems, this constitutional prohibition is invoked more than oc-
casionally to invalidate zoning ordinances which either lack stand-
ards, or which contain inadequate standards. Enough cases raising the
delegation issue continue to be decided to present a prima facie case
for investigation.
Yet the issues were found to lie deeper than the language of dele-
gation. Too often, the point is forgotten that an important purpose
of the delegation requirement is to prevent the arbitrary exercise of
discretionary power. Opportunities for arbitrary decision-making
do lie in the administrative phases of zoning. Dispensations from the
terms of the ordinance are commonly authorized by the zoning board
of adjustment. These take the form of variances for hardship cases,
and of exceptions for uses that are permitted in designated districts,
subject to. prior approval. Adequate standards can help prevent
arbitrary decisions by confining the exercise of the board's discretion.1
Opportunities for arbitrary decision-making also lie in other than
the administrative phases of zoning. Amendments to the ordinance,
for example, are subject to attack under the Equal Protection clause.
Like the delegation principle, the Equal Protection clause inhibits the
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University.
1. Dissatisfaction with the workability of zoning procedures has focused on
the boards of adjustment, and a series of excellent recent studies indicate that
the boards act arbitrarily, if not illegally, when granting zoning variances. See
Anderson, The Board of Zoning Appeals-Villain or Victim?, 13 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 353 (1962); Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A
Case Study in Misrule, 50 Ky. L.J. 273 (1962); Comment, Zoning: Variance
Administration in Alameda County, 50 CALIF. L. Rsv. 101 (1962). See also Note,
Zoning Variances and Exceptions: The Philadelphia Experience, 103 U. PA. L.
REV. 516 (1955).
For useful general discussions of zoning administration see Craig, Borogroves
and Mome Raths in the Wabe: The Language of Zoning Ordinances, 46 A.B.A.J.
434 (1960); Crawford, Special Exceptions Prove to be the Rule, 26 CoNN. B.J.
172 (1952); Reps, Discretionary Powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAw
& CONTEMP. PnoB. 280 (1955); Comment, Zoning Amendments and Variations,
and Neighborhood Decline in Illinois, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 470 (1953).
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arbitrary and achieves this goal either by requiring uniform treat-
ment or by insisting on differentiation according to reasonable classi-
fications. From the perspective of the zoning ordinance, the result in
an individual case will be the same. An arbitrary change in use, al-
lowed as a variance under an ordinance without standards, will be
struck down as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
An amendment, authorizing a change in use for a parcel that cannot
reasonably be differentiated from its neighbors, will be struck down
as a violation of Equal Protection.
This article, then, focuses on delegation problems in order to ex-
plore the control of arbitrary decision-making under zoning or-
dinances. It will begin with a critique of variances and exceptions,
and move on to a consideration of modern techniques that have
achieved more flexibility, often by adapting amendment processes.
Finally, some insights will be attempted into the underlying frame-
work of zoning administration.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
IN ZONING
As elsewhere in public administration, the basic problem in zoning
is to achieve as clear a differentiation as possible between policy-
making and policy-application. On this score the Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act,2 on which a majority of the state statutes are
modeled, failed to make tenable distinctions. Policy-making was con-
fided to the governing body of the locality, which was given the
authority to adopt the zoning ordinance. Administration was given
to the zoning administrator, s often the building inspector, who has
2. This act was first proposed in 1922 by the United States Department of
Commerce, and was widely used as a model in the adoption of state zoning
enabling acts. For the text of a state statute closely following the model act
see U.S. HOUSING AND HoME FINANCE AGENCY, COMPARATIVE DIGEST OF MUNICI-
PAL AND COUNTY ZONING ENABLING STATUTES vi-viii (1952).
3. Zoning ordinances customarily contain ancillary provisions supplemental to
the principal regulations. Ancillary provisions impose additional substantive re-
quirements whose application requires the exercise of some discretion, but they
are additional to the principal regulations and do not contemplate their change
or modification. These characteristics distinguish the ancillary provisions from
the true exceptions or variances. Ancillary provisions should be enforced by the
zoning administrator.
For example, an ancillary provision may require that a building front on a
public way. People ex reL Schimpff v. Norvell, 38 Ill. 325, 13 N.E.2d 960 (1938),
held unconstitutional an ordinance giving the building commissioner the authority
to decide whether a building fronted on an "officially approved place." The
quoted standard was held too vague. But cf. Mitchell v. Morris, 94 Cal. App. 2d
446, 210 P.2d 857 (1949), upholding an ordinance requiring that a building front
on a public street or on a private easement determined "to be adequate for the
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the power to issue zoning permits. But ambiguity comes in the
introduction of two agencies, the plan commission and the board of
adjustment, known also as the board of zoning appeals. Both the
commission and the board exercise functions that are partly legisla-
tive and partly administrative.4
The plan commission is to advise on the enactment and amendment
of the original ordinance. In theory, zoning amendments are to be
made in response to substantial changes in environmental conditions
or in other instances in which a policy change is indicated., Instead,
amendments have often been employed to take care of limited changes
in use, usually confined to one lot, a technique that has disapprovingly
been called "spot zoning." Spot zoning for one parcel, vigorously op-
posed by adjacent neighbors, takes on adversary characteristics that
give it a distinctly adjudicative cast.
The agency originally intended to provide a safety valve from the
zoning ordinance is the board of adjustment.6 This board was author-
ized to grant both variances and exceptions. Confusion about the role
of exceptions and variances is endemic to zoning, reflecting the con-
fusion over underlying purposes, and shows little sign of being re-
solved.7 The variance is an administratively-authorized departure
purpose of access." The power to make this determination was lodged in the
plan commission.
Another example of an ancillary provision is a requirement that "adequate"
off-street parking be required. Held constitutional: Mirschel v. Weissenberger,
277 App. Div. 1039, 100 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1950) (per curiam) (power in board of
zoning appeals); Schmitt v. Plonski, 215 N.Y.S.2d 170 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (same).
Contra, State ex Tel. Associated Land & Inv. Corp. v. City of Lyndhurst, 168
Ohio St. 289, 154 N.E.2d 435 (1958) (initial decision by building inspector).
4. As originally conceived, the Board of Zoning Appeals was to play a periph-
eral role in zoning administration. BASSETT, WILLIAMS, BETTItAN & WHITTEN,
MODEL LAWS FOR PLANNING CITIES, COUNTIES, AND STATES 10-12 (1935). They
suggest that the Board should be set up because "from time to time" exceptional
instances of practical difficulty would occur.
5. See Pomeroy, More on Zoning Amendments and the Master Plan, Nov. 1961
ZONING BULL. 1.
6. The cases have suggested that an escape valve in the form of a variance
provision is essential to the constitutionality of the ordinance. State ex Tel.
Landis v. Valz, 117 Fla. 311, 157 So. 651 (1934); Brandon v. Board of Comm'rs,
124 N.S.L. 135, 11 A.2d 304 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd 125 N.J.L. 367, 15 A.2d 598 (1940) ;
L. & M. Inv. Co. v. Cutler, 125 Ohio St. 12, 180 N.E. 379 (1932). No cases have
held, however, that an ordinance lacking a variance provision would be declared
unconstitutional.
7. See American Society of Planning Officials, Planning Advisory Service,
Information Report No. 40, Exceptions and Variances in Zoning (1952). This
paper avoids the term "conditional use," which has been employed to designate
a use requiring the prior approval both of the plan commission and of the govern-
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from the terms of the zoning ordinance, granted in cases of unique
and individual hardship, in which a strict application of the terms of
the ordinance would be unconstitutional. The grant of the variance
is meant to avoid an unfavorable holding on constitutionality.
By way of contrast, an exception is a use permitted by the ordinance
in a district in which it is not necessarily incompatible, but where it
might cause harm if not watched.8 Exceptions are authorized under
conditions which will insure their compatibility with surrounding
uses. Typically, a use which is the subject of a special exception de-
mands a large amount of land, may be public or semi-public in charac-
ter and might often be noxious or offensive. Not all of these character-
istics will apply to every excepted use, however. Hospitals in resi-
dential districts are one example, because of the extensive area they
occupy, and because of potential traffic and other problems which may
affect a residential neighborhood. A filling station in a light commer-
cial district is another example because of its potentially noxious
effects. 9
As originally conceived, the administrative structure merely sup-
plied the supporting cast for the zoning ordinance, which sought to
legislate policy by dividing the community into districts based on the
principle of compatibility. If this organizing device had worked, the
ambiguities inherent in the administrative structure might not have
become critical. But the division of a community into districts pre-
supposes that generalized differentiations of land use can successfully
be applied to a multiplicity of individual ownerships. This expectation
has not been realized, largely because an increasingly complex urban
environment requires delicate adjustments among competing land
uses. These adjustments cannot always be made before the fact.
Functionally, the problem has become more than just the allevia-
tion of hardship in "hard" cases, or the passing out of exceptions for
"tough" uses. The problem is one of finding a technique for making a
continuing series of adjustments as individual cases arise. Two types
of adjustment have proved difficult. At one extreme, the zoning
ordinance has not proved adequate to handle changes in use classifica-
tions that have to be made for individual lots. Inevitable crudities in
a priori classification have multiplied the instances in which use re-
ing body. Instead, all departures from traditional variance or exception proce-
dures are treated in the text as examples of the direct delegation of administra-
tive discretion under the zoning ordinance.
8. Kotrich v. County of Du Page, 19 Ill. 2d 181, 166 N.E.2d 601, appeal dismis-
sed, 364 U.S. 475 (1960), reviews the history of special exception provisions. See
also Anderson, The Use of the Special Use, 1959 (unpublished thesis in Univer-
sity of North Carolina Department of City and Regional Planning Library).
9. Cf. Titus St. Paul Property Owners Ass'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 205
Misc. 1083, 132 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (religious uses not offensive).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1963/iss1/4
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classifications must be sought for individual parcels. Use changes may
be obtained either through the amendment or through the variance-
exception process. But any change in use necessarily alters the under-
lying policy of the zoning ordinance, which attempted to allocate com-
peting uses in the first place.
At the other extreme, conventional zoning ordinances have been
difficult to apply to large tracts. In this context, problems of location
are difficult. On the outer urban fringe, where little development has
taken place, the territorial division of area into districts may be
difficult. In addition, traditional lot-and-block restrictions are difficult
to apply to integrated developments, which are planned without regard
to conventional ownership patterns.
In the face of these administrative problems, the courts have strug-
gled to separate policy-making and policy-application by preventing
arbitrary decisions in individual cases.10 A good example, which is
instructive for delegation doctrine, is spot zoning.' If a change in
use has been accomplished through an amendment of the ordinance,
delegation of power objections may not be applicable. But Equal
Protection objections may apply. A spot zoning amendment may
be granted arbitrarily to one parcel when other parcels similarly
situated are not given like treatment. An example would be a filling
station which is allowed on one corner of an intersection while the
remaining corners continue to be restricted to residential use. In this
case, the amendment would fall as arbitrary and discriminatory under
the Equal Protection clause. The essence of this constitutional re-
quirement has been written into some zoning statutes which seek to
10. On occasion, the court's reaction to a statutory standard will be influenced
by the underlying substantive policy which the standard seeks to implement. For
example, judicial hostility to architectural controls will lead a court to invalidate
an ordinance on the ground that a delegation to an architectural control com-
mittee contains insufficient standards. City of West Palm Beach v. State cx rel.
Duffey, 158 Fla. 863, 30 So. 2d 491 (1947); State ex rel. Magidson v. Henze, 342
S.W.2d 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961). Contra, Weldon Realty Corp. v. Town Council
of the Town of Westfield, No. L-7807-61, Super. Ct. N. J., February 14, 1962;
State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d
217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
On the other hand, judicial sympathy toward ordinances seeking to control and
eliminate nonconforming uses will lead to decisions upholding the standards used
to give a board of zoning appeals the power to control their expansion. Women's
Christian Ass'n of Kansas City v. Brown, 354 Mo. 700, 190 S.W.2d 900 (1945);
Fox v. Adams, 134 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
11. An analogy to spot zoning is often suggested in cases dealing with delega-
tion of power problems in variance, exception and related situations. See, e.g.,
Moriarty v. Pozner, 21 N.J. 199, 121 A.2d 527 (1956); Schmidt v. Board of
Adjustment, 9 N.J. 405, 88 A.2d 607 (1952).
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insure uniformity by requiring that zoning be carried out "in ac-
cordance with a comprehensive plan."'
1
The relationship between the delegation of power doctrine and
arbitrary decision-making's is clearly apparent in Gorieb V. Fox,
14
which upheld the validity of setback ordinances. These ordinances
set the distance between the front line of a building and the street.
In these ordinances the power to grant variances from the
setback requirement was reserved in the city council without stand-
ards. Nevertheless, the variance provision was upheld on the ground
that it was needed to take care of hardship cases. The Court re-
served the right to intervene in cases of actual discrimination. 15 In
this manner, the Court opens the door to supervision on a case-by-case
basis. Whether this kind of supervision can be adequate in the absence
of standards will be left for consideration later, but the analogy to the
Equal Protection approach to spot zoning is obvious.
12. Haar, "In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARv. L. REV. 1154
(1955).
13. Another instructive analogy is afforded by those cases in which the zoning
ordinance does not show district lines with sufficient precision, or leaves their
determination to an administrative official. In State v. Huntington, 145 Conn. 394,
143 A.2d 444 (1958), the district lines were simply drawn to existing uses and,
for this reason, were held not to be in accordance with a comprehensive plan. But
the Connecticut court has indicated that ambiguities in description can be resolved
if a plan is present. Leveille v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 145 Conn. 468, 144 A.2d
45 (1958); Kimberly v. Town of Madison, 127 Conn. 409, 17 A.2d 504 (1941).
Cf. In re Kensington-Davis Corp., 239 N.Y. 54, 145 N.E. 738 (1924); Taylor v.
Moore, 303 Pa. 469, 154 Atl. 799 (1931).
To be compared with the Connecticut cases is Auditorium, Inc. v. Board of
Adjustment, 47 Del. 373, 91 A.2d 528 (1952), voiding an ordinance authorizing
the zoning officials to establish district lines, but not providing any standards. The
point of all these cases is the same. In the absence of a "plan," or in the absence
of standards, the opportunities for arbitrary applications of the ordinance are
too great. Compare Wasem v. City of Fargo, 49 N.D. 168, 190 N.W. 546 (1922).
14. 274 U.S. 603 (1957). Accord, Papaioanu v. Commissioners of Rehobeth,
25 Del. Ch. 327, 20 A.2d 447 (1941): In varying setback, "the Commissioners
'shall maturely consider those matters of public welfare and safety set forth in
the preamble' of the ordinance." Id. at 336, 20 A.2d at 451. Sundeen v. Rogers,
83 N.H. 253, 141 Atl. 142 (1928) (unnecessary hardship variance provision of
setback ordinance upheld); Root v. City of Erie Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 180 Pa.
Super. 38, 118 A.2d 297 (1955) (exception allowed if required by topography or
existing building development). Compare Colyer v. City of Somerset, 306 Ky. 797,
208 S.W.2d 976 (1947), holding unconstitutional an ordinance which authorized
the city council to impose setbacks but which provided no standards. See Fair-
mont Inv. Co. v. Woermann, 357 Mo. 625, 210 S.W.2d 26 (1948).
15. The Gorieb case could be explained on the ground that the exercise of
discretion had been reserved to a legislative body, so that no standards were
needed. In other cases cited by the Court, however, discretion had been delegated
to administrative officials.
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II. THE VARIANCE POWER
How have the courts guarded against arbitrary decisions in the
exercise of the variance power? As the most conventional escape
device in the zoning ordinance, it authorizes the board of adjustment
to grant dispensations in cases of hardship that are unique to the in-
dividual lot. As applied to dimensional restrictions, the hardship
variance makes sense. This type of regulation covers lot widths, lot
sizes, yards and height. Modest variations to alleviate hardship
created by topographical, size and related features can be authorized
without doing violence to underlying policy.'0
A use variance, however, raises different problems. For one thing,
to permit a use variance in order to save the ordinance from uncon-
stitutionality is self-defeating. While a holding of unconstitutionality
would lift the zoning restriction from the affected parcel, the grant
of a use variance has much the same result. All that is prevented is
possible damage to the entire ordinance should the court find the
unconstitutional section non-severable, a risk that has not materi-
alized in practice. While an unfavorable constitutional result might
also weaken the ordinance in adjacent areas of the municipality, the
grant of a use variance for all practical purposes will have the same
effect.
More important, the test of "hardship" which is crucial to the
variance power has no real meaning as applied to a variance for use."7
16. From one point of view, the relaxation of zoning restrictions through the
variance process might be analogized to the remission or reduction of a penalty
authorized to be imposed by an administrative agency. Even in the absence of
standards, the customary judicial attitude has been that "mitigation is an act of
grace and that the alleged offender has neither substantive nor procedural rights."
1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAw TREATISE § 4.05 (1958). The remission approach
was adopted by some of those who participated in the drafting of the original
zoning enabling acts. BASSETT, op. cit. supra note 4, at 12. It is particularly
applicable to quantitative dimensional regulations. See the comment in State
ex reL Landis v. Valz, 117 Fla. 311, 320, 157 So. 651, 654 (1934), that the exercise
of the variance power is " a nonjusticiable subject matter."
17. The history of the zoning variance is instructive. It is modeled after an
1862 New York law which authorized a municipal board to grant variances from
the building code. While the draftsmen of the zoning enabling acts realized that
the building code context permitted the working out of fairly definite rules for
variances, while the zoning context did not, they decided to solve the problem by
adopting "the rather vague, elusive, and elastic clause known as the practical
difficulty and unnecessary hardship clause." BASSETT, op. cit. sUpra note 4, at
64-5. The expectation was that a more definite formula would develop over time;
this has not occurred. Criticism that the use variance would undermine the
zoning ordinance was answered by pointing out that variance changes were to
be limited to small areas and that a change covering too wide an area would be
illegal. Id. at 13. This forecast of judicial behavior has turned out to be fairly
accurate.
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The courts have made it clear that hardship must be peculiar to the
lot, and not general to the neighborhood. 8 Except in rare cases of
topographical and other oddities, hardship in the use of land can
arise only when the zoned use is incompatible with surrounding uses
as they have developed in the neighborhood. Yet general neighbor-
hood conditions that justify a use variance can just as easily support
a zoning amendment.
In the face of these semantic ambiguities, all of the cases that have
passed on the question have upheld the hardship standard against
delegation of power attacks.19 Early unfavorable decisions in Illinois2°
18. See Devaney v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 132 Conn. 537, 45 A.2d 828
(1946) ; Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 24 N.E.2d 851 (1939) (leading case).
19. Minney v. City of Azusa, 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (1958), appeal
dismissed, 359 U.S. 436 (1959) (commission had recommending power); Devaney
v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 132 Conn. 537, 45 A.2d 828 (1946) (court relies on
"unnecessary hardship" standard); Appeal of Blackstone, 38 Del. 230, 190 Atl.
597 (1937); Tau Alpha Holding Corp. v. Board of Adjustments, 126 Fla. 858,
171 So. 819 (1937); Anderson v. Jester, 206 Iowa 452, 221 N.W. 354 (1928);
Selligman v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 277 Ky. 551, 126 S.W.2d 419
(1938); State v. Gunderson, 198 Minn. 51, 268 N.W. 850 (1936); Freeman v.
Board of Adjustment, 97 Mont. 342, 34 P.2d 534 (1934); Fortuna v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment, 95 N.H. 211, 60 A.2d 133 (1948); Phillips v. City of Paterson,
8 N.J. Super. 281, 66 A.2d 65 (L. 1949) ; Brandon v. Board of Comm'rs, 124 N.J.L.
135, 11 A.2d 598 (1940); Application of Arlington Village Dev. Corp., 204 Misc.
895, 124 N.Y.S.2d 172 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 283 App. Div. 800, 128 N.Y.S.2d 596
(1954); Crossroads Realty, Inc. v. Gilbert, 109 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1951); Roosevelt
Field, Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead, 197 Misc. 621, 95 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct.
1949), rev'd on other grounds, 277 App. Div. 889, 98 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1950) ; Hilton
v. Board of Appeals, 18 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Sup. Ct. 1940); L. & M. Inv. Co. v. Cutler,
125 Ohio St. 12, 180 N.E. 379 (1932); Oklahoma City v. Harris, 191 Okla. 125,
126 P.2d 988 (1941); Huebner v. Philadelphia Say. Fund Soc'y, 127 Pa. Super. 28,
192 Atl. 139 (1937); Root v. City of Erie Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 180 Pa. Super.
88, 118 A.2d 297 (1955); Miller v. Zoning Bd., 2 Bucks 237 (Pa. C.P. 1952);
Spencer-Sturla Co. v. City of Memphis, 155 Tenn. 70, 290 S.W. 608 (1927) (ordi-
nance permitting dimensional variances); Thalhofer v. Patri, 240 Wis. 404, 3
N.W.2d 761 (1942). In several of these cases use variances were allowed. But
cf. Fairmont Inv. Co. v. Woermann, 357 Mo. 625, 210 S.W.2d 26 (1948). Favorable
decisions in Ohio and Iowa have been somewhat qualified by unfavorable judicial
decisions on exception provisions. And in State ex rel. Selected Properties, Inc. v.
Gottfried, 163 Ohio St. 469, 127 N.E.2d 371 (1955), the Ohio court held unconsti-
tutional an ordinance requiring a board of adjustment permit for filling stations
on the ground that it contained no standards. The dissenting opinion argued that
the permit authority was subject to the sections of the ordinance authorizing
hardship variances.
20. Welton v. Hamilton, 344 Ill. 82, 176 N.E. 333 (1931), followed in Speroni
v. Board of Appeals, 368 Ill. 568, 15 N.E.2d 302 (1938). Cf. City of Watseka v.
Blatt, 320 Ill. App. 191, 50 N.E.2d 589 (1943) (invalidating exception provision
containing no standards).
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and Maryland 2' have been effectively bypassed.2 2 While often the
hardship standard is barely questioned, reliance may sometimes be
placed on language in the ordinance that requires the board to con-
sider not only the hardship to the applicant, but the policy and spirit
of the ordinance, the public health, safety and welfare and the
dictates of "substantial justice."2' 3 The trouble here is that these
additional factors are the very police power considerations which
ought to underlie the enactment of the ordinance in the first place.
What the cases seem to say is that in varying an ordinance which
has been enacted in aid of the public health, safety and welfare, the
board of adjustment must reconsider the public health, safety and
welfare.
At the same time, acceptance of the hardship standard is sub-
stantially qualified by a large group of cases holding that variance
21. Sugar v. North Baltimore Methodist Protestant Church, 164 Md. 487, 165
Atl. 703 (1933); Jack Lewis, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 164
Md. 146, 164 Atl. 220, appeal dismissed, 290 U.S. 585 (1933); Goldman v.
Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 128 Atl. 50 (1925). But cf. Tighe v. Osborne, 150 Md.
452, 133 Atl. 465 (1926) ; Kramer v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 166 Md.
324, 171 Atl. 70 (1934) (upholding reserved power of city council to pass on
filling station applications).
22. For the later Illinois cases see Bindburg v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 8 Ill. 2d
254, 133 N.E.2d 266 (1956); Downey v. Grimshaw, 410 Ill. 21, 101 N.E.2d 275
(1951) ; People ex rel. Miller v. Gill, 389 Ill. 394, 59 N.E.2d 671 (1945) ; Papanek
v. Rayniak, 23 Ill. App. 2d 183, 161 N.E.2d 694 (1959). Cf. Illinois Bell Tele. Co.
v. Fox, 402 Ill. 617, 85 N.E.2d 43 (1949) (inferentially upholding exception
provision).
The Illinois cases are reviewed in Babcock, The Unhappy State of Zoning
Administration in Illinois, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 509, 515-20 (1959); Dallstream &
Hunt, Variations, Exceptions and Special Uses, 1954 U. ILL. L. F. 213. Statutory
adjustments made to overcome the unfavorable decisions on constitutionality
would not appear to have changed the basic character of the variance power.
See ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 24, §§ 11-13-4, 11-13-5 (1961).
While approval in the later Maryland cases was at first limited to dimensional
variances only, R. B. Constr. Co. v. Jackson, 152 Md. 671, 137 AtM 278 (1927), this
limitation has now been dropped. Loyola Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Buschman, 227 Md. 243, 176 A.2d 355 (1961). And in Montgomery County v.
Merlands Clubs, Inc., 202 Md. 279, 96 A.2d 261 (1953), the court upheld an ordi-
nance provision authorizing a special exception for a country club, and couched in
the usual language requiring consideration of the general purpose and intent of
the ordinance. See also Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Seabolt, 210 Md.
199, 123 A.2d 207 (1956), holding that the board may always grant an exception,
regardless of the validity of the standards, when the court itself would create an
exception by holding the ordinance pro tanto invalid.
23. See Fortuna v. Zoning Ed. of Adjustment, 95 N.H. 211, 60 A.2d 133
(1948); Hilton v. Board of Appeals, 18 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Miller v.
Zoning Ed., 2 Bucks 237 (Pa. C.P. 1952). In the Miller case the court referred
to the police power preamble to the ordinance in order to give content to the
variance standard.
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provisions do not confer power to grant a change in use.2 4 Whether
the decision is taken on an ultra vires or on a constitutional point,
these cases have made it clear that a use variance would be a usurpa-
tion of legislative power which cannot be permitted.25 Unfortunately,
many courts have approved use variances without explicitly con-
sidering their validity.2' Elsewhere, notably in Florida27 and New
24. Nicolai v. Board of Adjustment, 55 Ariz. 283, 101 P.2d 199 (1940); Bray
v. Beyer, 292 Ky. 162, 166 S.W.2d 290 (1942) ; Adams v. Board of Zoning Adjust-
ment, 241 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951); State ex rel. Nigro v. Kansas City, 325
Mo. 95, 27 S.W.2d 1030 (1930); Lee v. Board of Adjustment, 226 N.C. 107, 37
S.E.2d 128 (1946); Livingston v. Peterson, 59 N.D. 104, 228 N.W. 816 (1930);
Vandervort v. Sisters of Mercy, 97 Ohio App. 153, 117 N.E.2d 51 (1952);
Beveridge v. Harper & Turner Oil Trust, 168 Okla. 609, 35 P.2d 435 (1934);
Graves v. Johnson, 75 S.D. 261, 63 N.W.2d 341 (1954); Board of Adjustment v.
Levinson, 244 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Texas Consol. Theatres, Inc. v.
Pittilo, 204 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Harrington v. Board of Adjust-
ment, 124 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co.,
97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 (1939) (leading case). Cf. Appeal of the Catholic
Cemeteries Ass'n, 379 Pa. 516, 109 A.2d 537 (1954). Contra, Nelson v. Donaldson,
255 Ala. 76, 50 So. 2d 244 (1951).
25. The court's view of the scope of the variance power will also have an
important effect on the nature of the remedies available to the landowner who
wants to attack the zoning ordinance. Many courts require exhaustion of the
variance procedure before the board of adjustment as a prerequisite to an attack
on the constitutionality of the ordinance. 2 YOIEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 193 (1953). But exhaustion is not required if the administrative remedy is
inadequate. If the board of adjustment cannot grant a use variance, then any
objector attacking the use classification in court ought not to be forced to resort
to the board as a prerequisite to his lawsuit. An approach of this kind would
have a salutary effect on zoning administration, since it would afford landowners
objecting to the use classification a more rational method of attacking the
ordinance.
Some courts, in allowing an attack on the constitutionality of the ordinance,
have held that exhaustion of the variance procedure was not required under the
facts because a use variance would not be allowable. New York cases so holding
are collected in note 28, supra. To the same effect see Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v.
Village of Richton Park, 19 IMI. 2d 370, 157 N.E.2d 406 (1960). Here the owner
of a farm, which constituted the major portion of the residential zone in which
it was located, wanted to put his land to an industrial use and brought an action
attacking the validity of the ordinance. The court held that exhaustion was not
required because the variance procedure was not to be used to make major
changes in the zoning plan. In this case, a variance would radically alter the
nature of the zone. The case was followed in Liebling v. Village of Deerfield,
21 Ill. 2d 196, 171 N.E.2d 585 (1961) (landowner wanted to double intensity of
use by cutting lot size requirement by more than half). Cf. Board of Adjustment
v. Stovall, 218 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949): ordinance provision allowing
extension of business zone when it divides a lot held not to authorize a change
of use which would affect 82% of lot area.
26. See cases cited in Annot., 168 A.L.R. 13, 63 (1947).
27. In a well-reasoned decision, the Florida court held that if the board of
adjustment had the power to grant a use variance, it could nullify the decision
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York 2 8 the decisions have vacillated. The difficulties involved are
well-illustrated by a pair of contrasting Indiana cases. Antrim v.
Hohlt 9 disapproved a use variance for an apartment house in a resi-
of the legislative body. Josephson v. Autrey, 96 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1957). In
Kaeslin v. Adams, 97 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1957), the court handed down a per curiam
opinion in which it appeared to depart from the Josephson doctrine. A similar
point of view also appears in Wood v. Twin Lakes Mobile Homes Village, Inc.,
123 So. 2d 738 (Fla. App. 1960) (must apply to board of adjustment before
attacking constitutionality of ordinance). Next came the unusual decision in
Friedland v. City of Hollywood, 130 So. 2d 306 (Fla. App. 1961), which is
discussed in the text infra. Here the court quoted the Josephson case and held
that the city could not use the "variance" power to change the basic use classifica-
tion. Josephson is also followed in Mayflower Property, Inc. v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 137 So. 2d 849 (Fla. App. 1962): Application for variance not re-
quired as preliminary to attack on constitutionality of ordinance when applicant
would have required change from single-family to multiple-family district.
28. The New York position would appear to be summarized in Bellamy v.
Board of Appeals, 223 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1962), noting that "practical
difficulties" justify a dimensional variance, but that "unnecessary hardships"
must be the basis of a use variance. In this case a variance had been granted
for a one-story shopping center and off-street parking. The court noted that the
presence of business uses in the immediate neighborhood furnished a basis for a
finding of "unique circumstances of plight." Id. at 1021. The court reversed
the grant of the variance on other grounds. But cf. Coolidge v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeals, 62 Mass. 367, 189 N.E.2d 670 (1962) (adjacent commercialized area
does not justify use variance allowing office buildings in residential zone).
However another line of New York cases has severely criticized the use vari-
ance. The principal decision is Levy v. Board of Standards and Appeals, 267
N.Y. 347, 196 N.E. 284 (1935). A variance was requested for a filling station
which was to be located partly in an unrestricted district and partly in a business
district in which no stations were permitted. The board had granted the vari-
ance, basing its finding on conditions in the district, primarily the presence of
heavy traffic and trolley lines in the street. The court reversed, in a decision
which can be interpreted as holding merely that the board must base its finding
only on hardship special and peculiar to the parcel, and not on conditions general
to the neighborhood. Legislative action, said the court, is needed to change a
restriction considered to be unreasonable on the basis of conditions general to a
neighborhood. The administrative body cannot destroy the ordinance through
piecemeal exemptions of individual parcels of land.
The case could also be read to preclude any use variance. As the discussion
has indicated, a use variance must depend on conditions external to the parcel for
which the variance will apply, and the Levy case would appear to preclude
consideration- of these factors. But in People ex rel. Arverne Bay Constr. Co.
v. Murdock, 271 N.Y. 631, 3 N.E. 2d 457 (1936), the Levy case was explained as
having turned on an absence of a finding of special hardship applicable to the
site. See also Clark v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 301 N.Y. 86, 92 N.E.2d 903
(1950).
In other New York cases the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance has been
challenged, and the objection has been made that the rule of exhaustion of
administrative remedy through recourse to the board of adjustment has not been
satisfied. The court has answered that recourse to the board is not required in
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dential area. The court held that to permit so substantial a change
through the variance procedure would constitute a usurpation of
legislative authority. But in Nelson v. Board of Zoning Appeals,30
the court approved the grant of a variance for an apartment house at
virtually the same location. It distinguished Antrim on the ground
that in Nelson the acreage of the plot was smaller, and the apartment
house was smaller and not so dominant a feature. Apparently only
very large apartment houses are to be avoided in residential areas.31
What the courts are clearly struggling to do is to get the policy
questions decided at the legislative level.3 2 Otherwise, a series of de
facto use changes by way of the variance power will undermine the
ordinance. To the extent that a rational consideration of issues is
impossible in a series of individual variance proceedings, the modi-
fication of policy will also be arbitrary.
III. THE EXCEPTION POWER
While the variance power is most acceptable as a device to alleviate
dimensional hardships, the exception power is almost always used to
accomplish use changes without the intervention of a formal amend-
ment by the legislative body.33 What distinguishes the exception from
these cases because the board would not be authorized to grant a departure from
the general rules regulating use zones. The basis for these decisions is not clear.
Levitt v. Incorporated Village of Sands Point, 6 N.Y.2d 269, 160 N.E.2d 501
(1959) (variance would have covered 127 acres); Dowsey v. Village of Kensing-
ton, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427 (1931) (commercial use sought for small parcel
zoned residential). Cf. In e Mark Block Holding Corp., 141 Misc. 818, 253 N.Y.
Supp. 321 (1931) (hardship variance is for slight deviations).
29. 122 Ind. App. 681 108 N.E.2d 197 (1952). This case is something of a
puzzle, since it deals with the exception rather than with the variance provision
of the ordinance. Nevertheless, it treats the exception provision like a variance
and the holding is clearly applicable to the variance clause.
30. 240 Ind. 212, 162 N.E.2d 449 (1959). The supreme court reversed the
appellate court's decision, which should be consulted for an instructive essay on
the scope of the variance power. 158 N.E.2d 167 (Ind. App. 1959).
31. Compare Bern v. Borough of Fair Lawn, 65 N. J. Super. 435, 168 A.2d 52
(App. Div. 1961): A variance cannot be granted from ordinance provision re-
quiring that car-washing stations be located 1000 feet from public building.
32. A good example is Moriarty v. Pozner, 21 N.J. 199, 121 A.2d 527 (1956).
A variance for a shopping center was allowed in an area which was zoned and
had been built up as residential, and in which the shopping center would be out of
keeping with the neighborhood. The only reason for the variance was that an
increase in the tax base was needed, and that the original ordinance had no
shopping center provision. The variance was disallowed by the court on the
ground that it was a legislative use change which the board of adjustment could
not make.
33. When exception provisions, looking very much like variance clauses, have
been drawn to permit accessory uses, extend nonconforming uses or accomplish
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the variance is the absence of a hardship requirement. Customarily,
the ordinance lists as exceptions those uses that the board of adjust-
ment may permit in specified districts under a set of governing
standards. These standards may proliferate into several subsections,
but they usually resolve into a restatement of one or another aspect
of a vaguely-defined general welfare.
Both variance and exception provisions confer an administrative
dispensing power. They are cousins under the skin, and the resulting
similarities have brought about a good deal of judicial confusion.14
Sometimes the exception is treated as more and sometimes as less
lenient than the variance, 35 while at other times the exception is simply
characterized as a device necessary to afford some relaxation in the
ordinance provisions. 36 Similarly confused comparisons are drawn
between the exception and the amendment, sometimes with adverse
results to the power to grant exceptions and sometimes not.37
Nevertheless, the fundamental purpose of the exception is to serve
other less drastic tasks, they have always been sustained. Porporis v. City of
Warson Woods, 352 S.W.2d 605 (Mo. 1962) (off-street parking for shopping
center); Root v. City of Erie Zoning Bd., 180 Pa. Super. 38, 118 A.2d 297 (1955)
(front yard requirements); Boehme Bakery v. City of San Angelo, 185 S.W.2d
601 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) (extension of nonconforming use; exceptions for use
changes distinguished).
34. In some cases the ordinance is less than helpful. Thus in Moody v. City of
University Park, 278 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), the exception provision
of the ordinance contained a hardship requirement. The court interpreted this
not to mean unique hardship, as required under variance provisions, but to mean
future as well as past hardship, and hardship to the public and the applicant
which would result from the denial of the exception. In other words, the hardship
requirement, as it is understood under variance provisions, was read out of the
exception clause.
35. Compare Harte v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 80 R.I. 43, 91 A.2d 33 (1952),
suggesting that the exception power lies between the broad amendment and the
narrow variance provisions, with Johnston v. Board of Supervisors, 31 Cal. 2d
66, 187 P.2d 686 (1947), and Thomas v. Board of Standards and Appeals, 263
App. Div. 352, 33 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1942), rev'd on other grounds, 290 N.Y. 109, 48
N.E.2d 284 (1943), suggesting that the variance power is broader.
36. E.g., State ex rel. Manhein v. Harrison, 164 La. 564, 114 So. 159 (1927).
But cf. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Seabolt, 210 Md. 199, 123 A.2d
207 (Ct. App. 1956). Here the court is somewhat confused in its terminology, but
seems to suggest that an exception ought to be granted to avoid a holding of
unconstitutionality.
37. In Vulcan Materials Co. v. Griffith, 215 Ga. 811, 114 S.E.2d 29 (1960), the
court analogized the special permit procedure to spot zoning, held that both were
legislative acts, and therefore decided that the courts could not interfere with the
zoning result. The case takes a self-denying point of view which is remarkable.
But in Application of Stofflet & Tillotson, 18 Pa. D. & C.2d 104 (C.P. 1959), the
court held invalid as spot zoning, not in accord with a comprehensive plan, an
exception provision which authorized a change in use.
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in an ancillary role as an allocator of land use. In this it differs from
the variance, whose employment in the granting of land use changes
has been sharply criticized. Most of the cases have held the use ex-
ception constitutional, 3 although the judicial point of view adverse to
use variances comes up in cases that interpret the exception power
narrowly to avoid a constitutional delegation of power question.39
And in cases in which use exceptions covered too extensive an area,
they were invalidated in opinions which talked either ultra vires or
unconstitutionality or a mixture of both. 40
While superficially the use exception resembles the use variance,
the differences in judicial acceptance find an explanation in the sug-
gestion that a use exception is constitutional when it is expressly per-
mitted by the ordinance.41 The distinction here is between an un-
governed power to make use changes under a variance provision, and
a power to allow uses that the ordinance permits in certain districts,
subject to specified standards. Since the governing body has located
38. A few cases are contra. In State ex. rel. Selected Properties, Inc. v. Gott-
fried, 163 Ohio St. 469, 127 N.E.2d 371 (1955), the court may have thought that
it was dealing with a use variance. There was a strong dissent, and the case is
out of line with other Ohio decisions. In Application of Stofflet & Tillotson, 18
Pa. D. & C.2d 104 (C.P. 1959), the court held that an exception provision authoriz-
ing the introduction of a commercial use into a residential area violated the com-
prehensive plan requirement. It then proceeded on its own motion to authorize
the use as a hardship variance.
39. Harte v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 80 R.I. 43, 91 A.2d 33 (1952) (use excep-
tion construed narrowly); Harrington v. Board of Adjustment, 124 S.W.2d 401
(Tex. Civ. App. 1939) (ordinance construed to prohibit use exception). Cf. Stone
v. Cray, 89 N.H. 483, 200 Atl. 517 (1938) (zoning ordinance must set standards
for exceptions).
40. Adams v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 86 R.I. 396, 135 A.2d 357 (1957) (garden
apartment covering 26 residential lots); Board of Adjustment v. Stovall, 218
S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (extension of business use which would cover
82% of 18% acre lot). But see the cases in note 41, infra.
In Schoepple v. Township of Woodbridge, 60 N.J. Super. 146, 158 A.2d 338
(App. Div. 1960), a New Jersey "special reasons" variance was granted for a
shopping center. The "special reasons" variance is closest to an exception. See
the explanation in note 55 infra. The request had been granted in part because
of a finding that strip commercial zoning, as required by the ordinance, was not
adequate for modern commercial uses. The court reversed, finding an invasion of
legislative power on the grounds that the board could not use this procedure to
compensate "for ordinance deficiencies as pervasive as those found here."
41. Burnham v. Board of Appeals, 333 Mass. 114, 128 N.E.2d 772 (1955);
Congregation Adath Jeshurun v. Cheltenham Township, 70 Montg. 345 (Pa. C.P.
1954) ; Moody v. City of University Park, 278 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) ;
Driskell v. Board of Adjustment, 195 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946). The
Texas cases qualify the earlier case of Harrington v. Board of Adjustment, 124
S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), which had appeared to suggest that a use
variance would be unconstitutional. Cf. Bishop v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 133
Conn. 614, 53 A.2d 659 (1947).
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the areas in which excepted uses may be permitted, the board only
exercises a governable discretion when it determines whether the
conditions are present under which these uses can be allowed. The
next question is whether the standards that have been afforded are
adequate.
Provisions governing the grant of exceptions fall into three general
categories. Two of these may be dealt with briefly:
A. Nuisance standard.
This kind of standard may be phrased negatively, so that a use will
not be allowed as an exception if it emits noise, smoke or dust, or if it
is offensive to neighboring properties. One of the functions of the
exception is to control the potentially noxious use, so that a standard
of this type ought to be sustainable by analogy to common-law
nuisance doctrine. Judicial approval of nuisance standards has been
overwhelming,42 and in many instances the fact that a noxious use
is being regulated has encouraged the court to uphold the delegation.
B. Lack of any standard.
In all too many instances, ordinances have attempted to regulate
the granting of exceptions without setting any standards whatso-
ever. Either the draftsman has been careless, or has not been con-
42. Upholding a noxious use standard: Walls v. City of Guntersville, 253 Ala.
480, 45 So. 2d 468 (1950); Harden v. City of Raleigh, 192 N.C. 395, 135 S.E. 151
(1926) ; Ours Properties, Inc. v. Ley, 198 Va. 848, 96 S.E.2d 754 (1957). Contra,
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Anderson, 74 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1954), where there was
evidence that the governing body turned down an application for a filling station
because they did not want competition with stations they ran themselves.
Upholding standards requiring that the board give consideration to the effect
that the use will have on the neighborhood: Building Comm'r of Medford v. C.
& H. Co., 319 Mass. 273, 65 N.E.2d 537 (1946) (dumping of refuse); Certain-
Teed Products Corp. v. Paris Township, 351 Mich. 434, 88 N.W.2d 705 (1958)
(gypsum mining); of. Wheeler v. Gregg, 90 Cal. App. 2d 348, 203 P.2d 37 (1949)
(general welfare standard applied to excavating operation).
Particularly under the earlier ordinances, and particularly in the case of
filling stations, the power to grant use permits might be reserved to the governing
body. For this reason, as the discussion in the text indicates infra, no standards
would be needed. In addition, the courts have held that no standards would be
needed because of the dangerous character of the use. In part, the reasoning is
that since these uses could be absolutely prohibited without standards, they may
also be regulated without standards. For filling station cases see Xramer v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 166 Md. 324, 171 Atl. 70 (Ct. App. 1934);
Green Point Say. Bank v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 281 N.Y. 534, 24 N.E.2d 319
(1939), appeal dismissed, 309 U.S. 633 (1940) (leading case); Zelazny v. Town
Bd., 101 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1950). See also Fucigna v. Sahn, 15 Misc. 2d 304,
179 N.Y.S.2d 64 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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cerned with the problem of limiting administrative discretion. With
little dissent, 3 these ordinances have been held unconstitutional.44
On this score, however, a recent Michigan case demands attention.
In Township of Superior v. Reimel Sign Co.,4 5 the township ordinance
prohibited advertising signs in agricultural districts except under a
temporary permit from the board of adjustment. Although no stand-
ards were provided, the ordinance was upheld. In an earlier case, the
court had invalidated a permit ordinance for filling stations, under
which the board's discretion was equally uncontrolled. Yet the earlier
case was distinguished, since there a permit was required for filling
stations in a commercial zone, where filling stations were not pro-
hibited. In the Reimel case all signs had been prohibited in the agri-
43. Kohnberg v. Murdock, 6 N.Y.2d 937, 161 N.E.2d 217 (1959), a per curiam
opinion over a strong dissent. Note should also be taken: 1) of those cases
which have found a sufficient limitation on administrative discretion if the
ordinance merely locates the excepted use in a designated district, see note 41,
supra, and 2) of those cases which have dispensed with standards when a noxious
use has been involved, see note 42, supra.
44. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Goodman, 128 Colo. 344, 262 P.2d 261
(1953) (advertising signs); North Bay Village v. Blackwell, 88 So. 2d 524 (Fla.
1956) (filling station); City of Watseka v. Blatt, 320 Ill. App. 191, 50 N.E.2d
589 (1943) (junk yards); Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R.R. v. Liddle, 112 N.W.2d 853
(Iowa 1962) (stockyards); Bultman Mortuary Service, Inc. v. City of New
Orleans, 174 La. 360, 140 So. 503 (1932) (funeral parlor); State ex Tel. Con-
tinental Oil Co. v. Waddill, 318 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1958) (filling station); Board
of Comm'rs v. A. S. Pater Realty Co., 73 N.J. Super. 155, 179 A.2d 169 (Ch.
1962) (advertising sign); Phillips v. Town of Belleville, 135 N.J.L. 271, 52 A.2d
441 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (same); Gordon v. Town of Hempstead, 196 Misc. 954, 93
N.Y.S.2d 250 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (parking lot); Little v. Young, 82 N.Y.S.2d 909
(Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 274 App. Div. 1005, 85 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1948), aff'd, 299 N.Y.
699, 87 N.E.2d 74 (1949) (ocean front bathhouse and cabana); Bizzell v. Board
of Alderman, 192 N.C. 348, 135 S.E. 59 (1926) (filling station); State ex Tel.
Central Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Leonhard, 124 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio C. P. 1953)
(advertising signs); Application of Phi Lambda Theta House Ass'n, 400 Pa. 60,
161 A.2d 144 (1960) (fraternity house); Dooling's Windy Hill, Inc. v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment, 371 Pa. 290, 89 A.2d 505 (1952) (hotel); Marrone v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment, 43 Del. 166 (Pa. C.P. 1956) (restaurant); Kleinman v. Zoning
Bd. of Appeals, 6 Pa. D. & C.2d 659 (C.P. 1955) (dry cleaning establishment);
Miller v. Zoning Bd., 2 Bucks 237 (Pa. C.P. 1952) (extension of nonconforming
use); Schloss Poster Advertising Co. v. City of Rock Hill, 190 S.C. 92, 2 S.E.2d
892 (1939) (advertising signs). Cf. Smith v. Board of Appeals, 319 Mass. 341,
65 N.E.E2d 547 (1946) (conversion of single-family home, provided structure not
enlarged); Potts v. Board of Adjustment, 133 N.J.L. 230, 43 A.2d 850 (Sup. Ct.
1945) (similar); Concordia Collegiate Institute v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189, 93 N.E.2d
632 (1950) (educational institution; 80% of property owners must consent);
Davison v. Flanagan, 273 App. Div. 870, 76 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1948) (conversion of
single-family home; standards not given by court); State ex Tel. Synod of Ohio
v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515 (1942) (dictum) (church).
45. 862 Mich. 481, 107 N.W.2d 808 (1961).
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cultural zone. What the court could have had in mind is not clear,
since all excepted uses are effectively prohibited by the ordinance until
they are allowed by the board. 46
A third type of standard deserves more detailed treatment:
C. General welfare standards.
Under the typical zoning enabling act, the hardship standard for
variances is explicitly contained in the law, but the standards
governing the board of adjustment in the granting of exceptions are
not spelled out. The act usually provides that exceptions may be
granted under terms and conditions to be stated by the ordinance,47
or in any case in which the purpose and intent of the ordinance will
not be violated.4 8 Many zoning ordinances merely echo the words of
the statute, and authorize the granting of exceptions under a
generalized standard which may vaguely be termed as a reference to
the general welfare.
In most of the cases the general welfare standard has been upheld.
There are several variants. The ordinance may refer simply to the
general welfare or to the convenience of the community. 4 In other in-
46. The court may have been confused over the effect of holding the ordinance
unconstitutional. In the Reimel case, the defendant had painted a sign on a barn
without bothering to secure a permit. The court noted that, even if the permit
section were unconstitutional for lack of standards, the sign was still prohibited
by the provisions of the ordinance regulating uses in agricultural districts. In
other cases in which an applicant denied a permit has challenged the standards
in the ordinance, the court has assumed that invalidation of the standards has the
effect of allowing the excepted use. This result may flow in part from the
language of the older zoning ordinances, which enacted prohibitions rather than
permissions. All uses not prohibited by the ordinance were permitted. As the only
prohibition on the excepted use is in the special permit provision, the invalidation
of that provision has the effect of permitting the excepted use since it is not
otherwise prohibited by the ordinance.
More modern ordinances draft their use regulations in the form of permissions,
and any use not permitted is then prohibited. Therefore, even if the special ex-
ception provision is held unconstitutional, it remains prohibited under the use
regulations in the ordinance. This appeared to be the situation in the Reimel
case. However, invalidation of the special exception provision could conceivably
lead to invalidation of the entire ordinance on nonseverability grounds.
47. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 414.12(2) (1949) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 525nn (2)
(1961). This language appears to be used most commonly.
48. E.g., MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 40A, § 4 (1961).
49. Jennings v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 103 A.2d 535
(1954) (convenience and necessity to be weighed against policy of zoning ordi-
nance); State ex T'eL Manhein v. Harrison, 164 La. 564, 114 So. 159 (1927);
Schmidt v. Board of Adjustment, 9 N. J. 405, 88 A.2d 607 (1952) ; Tulsa Oil Co. v.
Morey, 137 N.J.L. 388, 60 A.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ; Aloe v. Dassler, 278 App. Div.
975, 106 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1951), affd', 303 N.Y. 878,105 N.E.2d 104 (1952); Romig v.
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stances, the language of some of the enabling acts will be followed, and
the exception will have to be in accord with the purpose and intent of
the ordinance. 50 The intent of the ordinance is usually expressed, how-
ever, in terms of advancing the general welfare of the community. 51
Finally, a multiple standard may be used, combining those listed
above or incorporating, in addition, the generalized zoning objectives
that are usually included in preambles to zoning enabling acts and
zoning ordinances. 52
-
The cases that have sustained a general welfare standard against
a delegation of power attack have done so with little in the way of
critical comment. 53 When a critical appraisal has been attempted,
Weld, 87 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Woodbury v. Zoning Ed. of Review, 78
R.I. 319, 82 A.2d 164 (1951).
The nuisance origins of special exception provisions are reflected in standards
directing consideration of the effect of the use on the immediate neighborhood.
See note 42 supra for cases upholding such a standard as it has been applied to
noxious uses. Acord, as applied to non-noxious uses, Hopkins v. MacCulloch, 35
Cal. App. 2d 442, 95 P.2d 950 (1939); St. John's Roman Catholic Church v.
Town of Darien, 184 A.2d 42 (Conn. 1962); State ex rel. Pruzan v. Redman, 374
P.2d 1002 (Wash 1962). In some instances this standard has been coupled with
the general welfare standard: Matthews v. Board of Supervisors, 203 Cal. App.
2d 890, 21 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1962); McCord v. Ed Bond & Condon Co., 175 Ga. 667,
165 S.E. 590 (1932); Sellors v. Town of Concord, 329 Mass. 259, 107 N.E.2d 784
(1952); Monforte v. Zoning Ed. of Review, 176 A.2d 726 (R.I. 1962); Barbara
Realty Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 87 R.I. 100, 138 A.2d 818 (1958). Cf. Lyons
v. Zoning Ed. of Adjustment, 88 Del. 275 (Pa. C.P. 1951) (in accord with the
public interest).
50. Bishop v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 133 Conn. 614, 53 A.2d 659 (1947);
Opinion of the Justices, 321 Mass. 759, 73 N.E.2d 881 (1947) (without damaging
public good or intent of ordinance); Perri v. Zoning Ed. of Appeals, 283 App.
Div. 818, 128 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1954); Kessel v. Michaelis, 15 Misc. 2d 755, 159
N.Y.S.2d 109 (1956), aff'd, 4 App. Div. 2d 884, 167 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1957), appeal
dismissed, 4 N.Y.2d 803, 149 N.E.2d 532 (1958); Application of Good Fellowship
Ambulance Club, 406 Pa. 465, 178 A.2d 578 (1962); Mandrack v. East Norriton
Township, 75 Montg. L. Rep. 473 (Pa. C.P. 1959); Congregation Adath Jeshurun
v. Cheltenham Township, 70 Montg. L. Rep. 345 (Pa. C.P. 1954); Momeir v. John
McAlister, Inc., 203 S.C. 353, 27 S.E.2d 504 (1943). Cf. Montgomery County v.
Merlands Club, 202 Md. 279, 96 A.2d 261 (1953) (general purpose and intent plus
effect on neighborhood).
51. Application of Good Fellowship Ambulance Club, supra note 50.
52. Erdman v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 212 Md. 288, 129 A.2d 124 (1957);
Oursler v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 204 Md. 397, 104 A.2d 568 (1954); Bradley
v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 255 Mass. 160, 150 N.E. 892 (1926) ; State ex rel.
Ludlow v. Guffey, 306 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. 1957); Kanasy v. Nugent, 206 Misc. 826,
135 N.Y.S.2d 128 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd, 286 App. Div. 1038, 145 N.Y.S.2d 638
(1955); Maxwell v. Klaess, 192 Misc. 939, 82 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct.), appeal
dismissed, 274 App. Div. 943, 85 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1948).
53. Exception provisions usually require that the board attach conditions to
the permit which will be protective of neighboring property. The question then
arises whether the protective conditions are a requirement to be imposed after the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1963/iss1/4
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the results have been far from satisfactory. The point may be made
that the exception provision merely allows the board to find the
"facts" under which the excepted use can be allowed.54 Of course, an
administrative board may always find facts, all of which is beside
the point if the ordinance does not contain standards sufficient to
isolate the facts that have to be found. Other courts simply abandon
the review function, taking the position that the complexities of
zoning administration inhibit the drafting of more definite stand-
ards.55
Little help is gained from the respectable number of decisions that
hold the general welfare standard unconstitutional,50 for those cases
permit has been authorized, or a standard to be met before the permit can be
granted. For a case taking the second point of view see Porporis v. City of
Warson Woods, 352 S.W.2d 605 (Mo. 1962) (standards held constitutional). This
interpretive question has not been raised as often as would be expected.
54. See Wheeler v. Gregg, 90 Cal. App. 2d 348, 203 P.2d 37 (1949) (can deter-
mine facts if discretion not unguided); City of Detroit v. S. Loewenstein & Son,
330 Mich. 359, 47 N.W.2d 646 (1951); City of East Lansing v. Smith, 277 Mich.
495, 269 N.W. 573 (1936).
55. Tustin Heights Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 170 Cal. App. 2d
619, 339 P.2d 914 (1959); Burnham v. Board of Appeals, 333 Mass.
114, 128 N.E.2d 772 (1955); Ward v. Scott, 11 N.J. 117, 93 A.2d 385 (1952)
(leading case); Thomas v. Board of Standards & Appeals, 263 App. Div. 352,
33 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1942), rev'd on other grounds, 290 N.Y. 109, 48 N.E.2d 284
(1943); People ex rel. Beinert v. Miller, 188 App. Div. 113, 176 N.Y. Supp. 398
(1919). In National Maritime Union v. City of Norfolk, 202 Va. 672, 119 S.E.2d
307 (1961) the court recognized a police power exception to the delegation
requirement, based on the impracticalities of specifying standards in advance
when the public welfare must be protected. Ward v. Scott considered the uniquo
New Jersey "special reasons" variance, which lies between the true variance
and true exception but which seems more like an exception because of the absence
of a hardship standard. See Cunningham, Control of Land Use in New Jersey by
Means of Zoning, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 37, 77-81, 86-94 (1959).
56. Redwood City Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Menlo Park,
167 Cal. App. 2d 686, 335 P.2d 195 (1959); Keating v. Patterson, 132 Conn. 210,
43 A.2d 659 (1945); Broach v. Young, 100 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1958) (per curiam);
Gaudet v. Economical Super Mkt., Inc., 237 La. 1082, 112 So. 2d 720 (1959);
McCauley v. Albert E. Briede & Son, 231 La. 36, 90 So. 2d 78 (1956); Osius v.
City of St. Clair Shores, 344 Mich. 693, 75 N.W.2d 25 (1956) (leading case);
Underhill v. Board of Appeals, 17 Misc. 2d 257, 72 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
273 App. Div. 788, 75 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1947), 297 N.Y. 937, 80 N.E.2d 342 (1948);
Bailey v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 179 A.2d 316 (R.I. 1962); Flynn v.
Zoning Bd. of Review, 77 R.I. 118, 73 A.2d 808 (1950) (leading case). Cf.
Andrews v. Board of Supervisors, 200 Va. 637, 107 S.E.2d 445 (1959) (broad
special use provision in rural area). In the following cases the courts seem to
suggest that a welfare standard would be invalid: Congregation Temple Israel v.
City of Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. 1959) ; Gilchrest Realty Corp. v. Village
of Great Neck Plaza, 85 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct. 1948), rev'd on other grounds,
275 App. Div. 962, 90 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1949), 300 N.Y. 619, 90 N.E.2d 485 (1949);
Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Baker, 140 Ore. 600, 15 P.2d 391 (1932).
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are about as absolute in their rejection as the others are in their
acceptance.5 7 Furthermore, in most of these jurisdictions there is
authority holding valid an exception provision strikingly similar to
the provision held invalid in another opinon by the same court.5 s
What is of interest is the dominant note in the unfavorable cases that
a general welfare standard creates too much opportunity for dis-
crimination and abuse of discretion. This attitude links up with the
Equal Protection basis for the delegation of power requirement.
The same comments may be made here as were made about the
use variance. When a general welfare standard governs the grant of
an exception, the board of adjustment is controlled by the same policy
considerations which ought to guide the enactment of the ordinance in
,the first place. This observation gains support from a group of
cases that have upheld ordinances in which a general welfare standard
has not been explicitly provided. The decisions conveniently imply a
general welfare standard by reading the preamble of the ordinance
into the exception provision.59 The preamble, of course, usually
57. E.g., Underhill v. Board of Appeals, supra note 56. In a few of the un-
favorable cases the ordinance uses a single specific rather than a general standard.
For example, one ordinance based the grant of an exception for multi-level
garages on the impact which the proposed use would have on traffic conditions.
Drexel v. City of Miami Beach, 64 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1953). See also Finn v.
Municipal Council, 136 N.J.L. 34, 53 A.2d 790 (Err. & App. 1946), holding invalid
an ordinance permitting filling stations in business districts provided they did
not create a fire or traffic hazard. A particularized direction of this type would
appear more capable of uniform application than a general welfare standard.
58. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first appeared to hold a general welfare
standard invalid in Application of Devereux Foundation, Inc., 351 Pa. 478, 41
A.2d 744, appeal dismissed, 326 U.S. 686 (1945). At least this was the interpreta-
tion put on the case in Miller v. Zoning Bd., 2 Bucks 237 (Pa. C.P. 1952). But
Devereux now appears to have been overruled in a very muddy opinion. Applica-
tion of Good Fellowship Ambulance Club, 406 Pa. 465, 178 A.2d 578 (1962). Other
courts have vacillated while being even less straightforward. Compare Bishop v.
Board of Zoning Appeals, 133 Conn. 614, 53 A.2d 659 (1947), with Keating v.
Patterson, 132 Conn. 210, 43 A.2d 659 (1945) Barbara Realty Co. v. Zoning
Ed. of Review, 87 R.I. 100, 138 A.2d 818 (1958) and Flynn v. Zoning Ed. of
Review, 77 R.I. 118, 73 A.2d 808 (1950).
59. City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 236, 347
P.2d 294 (1959); Olp v. Town of Brighton, 173 Misc. 1079, 19 N.Y.S.2d 546
(Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 262 App. Div. 944, 29 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1941) (general welfare
considerations pervade the whole ordinance); Stoll v. Gulf Oil Corp., 155 N.E.2d
83 (Ohio C.P. 1958); In re Dawson, 136 Okla. 113, 277 Pac. 226 (1928); Mil-
waukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Mullen, 214 Ore. 281, 330 P.2d
5 (1958); In re O'Hara's Appeal, 389 Pa. 35, 131 A.2d 587 (1957) (relies on
interpretation section); Smith v. City of Brookfield, 272 Wis. 1, 74 N.W.2d 770
(1956). In the Brookfield case the dissenting opinion argued that a preamble
could be consulted to clarify the meaning of a statute, but not to save it from
unconstitutionality.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1963/iss1/4
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
dedicates the ordinance to the general welfare. In some states, this
approach violates a rule of statutory interpretation that forbids
giving the preamble a substantive effect. But the point is that the
preamble was intended to guide legislative action as well. The over-
riding applicability of the preamble both to legislative and administra-
tive decisions under the ordinance merely highlights the underlying
ambiguities in the entire structure.60
IV. ADEQUATE PROCEDURES AS A DEFENSE TO IMPROPER DELEGATION
In Gorieb v. Fox, the United States Supreme Court had suggested
that it could always intervene should the dispensing power under the
setback ordinance be handled arbitrarily. In like manner Professor
Kenneth Davis has stressed the importance of fair procedures as a
control over the dangers of inadequate standards, and uses a lead-
ing zoning case to make his point.61 The Davis view has now been
adopted to justify, at least in part, the standards contained in the
Oregon state building code. 62
Several of the zoning cases dealing with exception provisions
similarly rely on the availability of review procedures to sustain the
standards in the ordinance. The reference is not always the same,
however. Sometimes it is to the availability of comprehensive fact-
finding and hearing procedures leading to the final determination by
the board.6 3 On other occasions it is a reference to review by a
superior administrative body,6 4 by the legislative body65 or most
frequently by the courts.66
60. In one case the ordinance allowed the plan commission to permit in any
district any use "in general keeping with the uses authorized in such district."
This provision was sustained. McCloud v. Woodmansee, 165 Ohio St. 271, 135
N.E.2d 316 (1956). Yet the allocation of uses on the basis of compatibility is
supposed to be the legislative function of the governing body. Compare the cases
in notes 42 and 49 supra, in which the board has been authorized to consider the
effect of the excepted use on the immediate neighborhood. Cf. Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Town of Rye, 16 Misc. 2d 284, 182 N.Y.S.2d 688 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
But cf. State v. Kressler, 50 N.J. Super. 362, 142 A.2d 257 (County Ct. 1958).
61. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATivE LAw TREATISE § 2.08 (1958).
62. Warren v. Marion County, 222 Ore. 307, 353 P.2d 257 (1960), criticized in
14 STAN. L. RzV. 372 (1962).
63. Porporis v. City of Warson Woods, 352 S.W.2d 605 (Mo. 1962); Ward v.
Scott, 11 N.J. 117, 93 A.2d 385 (1952) (leading case); Katzin v. McShain, 371
Pa. 251, 89 A.2d 519 (1952) ; National Maritime Union v. City of Norfolk, 202 Va.
672, 119 S.E.2d 307 (1961).
64. In City of Miami Beach v. State ex rel. Ross, 141 Fla. 407, 193 So. 543
(1940) the court sustained the validity of the delegation, in part because the
action of the city council on an application for a permit was appealable to a
board of administration. The case is qualified by North Bay Village v. Blackwell,
88 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1956), which holds that the standards provided in the zoning
ordinance must be adequate.
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To the extent that the provision of adequate administrative fact-
finding procedures is thought to give protection to the applicant, the
cases probably reflect the requirement, usual in administrative law,
that administrative decisions be backed by adequate findings of fact.
Otherwise, the reliance on adequate review appears to be a reference
to the protection afforded by a system of checks and balances, with
reliance on the judicial check coming up most frequently.
How court review might function in the absence of standards is
indicated by Larkin Co. v. Schwab,6 7 an early New York case which
follows the lead of Gorieb v. Fox. In Larkin there were no standards
in an ordinance requiring permits for the operation of a filling station,
and as the authority to grant permits had been conferred on the
governing body, the court decided that no standards were necessary.
However, noting that the applicant had filed an action in mandamus to
compel the council to give him a permit, the court added that his action
would lie if the council had acted arbitrarily.
The scope of review in mandamus is thus surprisingly similar to the
scope of review usually accorded to board of adjustment decisions. In
most states, following the lead of the standard enabling act, board of
adjustment decisions are reviewable by statutory certiorari. 68 Al-
65. Olp v. Town of Brighton, 173 Misc. 1079, 19 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Sup. Ct. 1940),
aff'd, 262 App. Div. 944, 29 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1941); Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's
Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Ore. 281, 330 P.2d 5 (1958), appeal dismissed, 359 U.S.
436 (1959). A few states still have statutes under which the board of adjustment's
function is recommendatory, and under these provisions the variance or excep-
tion is not final without the approval of the governing body. See Cunningham,
supra note 55, at 73-76. In this event the delegation question may not be pre-
sented, on the ground that the governing body's function is legislative and that
it retains the final decision. Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137
N.E.2d 371 (1956). On the other hand, if the governing body's function is
characterized as administrative, standards may still be needed at that level. See
the discussion in the text, infra.
66. Walls v. City of Guntersville, 253 Ala. 480, 45 So. 2d 468 (1950); Economy
Wholesale Co. v. Rodgers, 232 Ark. 835, 340 S.W.2d 583 (1960); Holy Sepulchre
Cemetery v. Town of Greece, 191 Misc. 241, 79 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Sup. Ct. 1947),
aff'd, 273 App. Div. 942, 79 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1948) ; Olp v. Town of Brighton, supra
note 65; In re Dawson, 136 Okla. 113, 277 Pac. 226 (1928); Spencer-Stural Co.
v. City of Memphis, 155 Tenn. 70, 290 S.W. 608 (1927) (variance case); Ours
Properties, Inc. v. Ley, 198 Va. 848, 96 S.E.2d 754 (1957).
67. 242 N.Y. 330, 151 N.E. 637 (1926). This case may be said to be based on
the general constitutional law principle, that the court will invalidate a vaguely-
drafted ordinance only in a case of actual discrimination.
This principle appears often in variance and exception cases. See City of Stock-
ton v. Frisbie & Latta, 93 Cal. App. 277, 270 Pac. 270 (1928) ; City of Lincoln v.
Fross, 119 Neb. 666, 230 N.W. 592 (1930).
68. See COMPARATIVE DIGEST OF MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY ZONING ENABLING
STATUTEs, op. cit. supm note 2, at vi, for the text of a typical zoning enabling act.
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though the scope of review might conceivably be broader in a certi-
orari action, the courts have almost always said that the decision of
the board will be upset only if it is arbitrary.
Critics of the Davis position have claimed that reliance on court
review to remedy the defects of inadequate delegation is not helpful
because, in the absence of standards, the court will have no basis for
intervention.69 However, there are two answers to this contention.
The first is that the court can fashion its own standards when re-
:viewing administrative determinations in exception and variance
cases. In the Larkin case, the court pointed out that mandamus would
lie to correct municipal action that was arbitrary either because the
council considered factors that it should not consider, or because in
any other way it abused its discretion. In an attempt to show that
the council had acted arbitrarily, the applicant introduced evidence
that his filling station would not have an adverse effect on the
neighborhood, that there was no danger from storage and that traffic
access was sufficient. The court held that the council had exercised
its discretion properly. While the courts will have some leeway when
review is as broad as the Larkin case suggests, the scope of review
certainly is no greater than that afforded under the vague hardship
and general welfare standards that are commonly found in zoning
ordinances. In any event, the discipline of a common subject matter
will force consideration of similar factors in most cases. The factors
advanced by the applicant in the Larkin case are similar to those
considered by boards and courts under the usual variance and excep-
tion provisions.
A second point is that the courts usually take a self-denying atti-
tude, even when reviewing board of adjustment determinations in
statutory certiorari proceedings, and at least say that they are loath
to upset the administrative fact-finding. If this is so, then the courts
in practice have little more scope for review when standards are pro-
vided, and when there is a statutory appeal by certiorari, than they
do when their jurisdiction is invoked in a mandamus proceeding to
review a determination made in the absence of standards. These com-
ments reinforce the suggestion made earlier, that the difficulties with
zoning administration lie deeper than the language of delegation.
V. DISCRETIONARY ADMINISTRATION
Under the more conventional hardship variance and exception
provisions, the exercise of administrative discretion is peripheral to
the zoning ordinance, which is relied upon to make the determinative
allocations of land use. As difficulties have been encountered in
69. 14 STAN. L. Rzv. 372 (1962).
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applying pre-drawn district regulations to uses that are hard to
handle, zoning ordinances have tended to handle the administrative
problem by committing the listing fallacy. The ordinance may set up
a long list of special uses to be allowed in designated zones under the
exception procedure. This device achieves greater flexibility by in-
creasing the number of uses that are subject to administrative dis-
pensation. But the over-listing of special uses is unwieldy, especially
as many marginal cases may not be covered through inadvertence.
More recent developments have relegated major land-use decisions
to the administrative process, and in this manner have built the
discretionary function directly into the zoning ordinance.70 The point
was made earlier that large-tract developments, such as shopping
centers and residential subdivisions, are hard to fit into the more con-
ventional lot-and-block mold. Substantive difficulties in dealing with
the design and location of large scale developments have forced
changes in the administrative structure of the zoning ordinance.
These changes have tended to eliminate or to lessen the impact of
prezoning, and to convert the traditional dispensing power of the
zoning agencies into a more direct administrative control.
The newer kind of discretionary zoning ordinance has implications
for planning policy that may eventually be far-reaching. One of its
purposes, for example, is to give the zoning authority more leverage
over patterns of community growth by requiring the big developers
to seek permission anew in every case.7 1 At this point, delegation of
power objections to discretionary zoning administration will be ex-
70. For reviews of these developments see Craig, Particularized Zoning: Altera-
tions While You Wait, 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1960 INSTITUTE ON PLANNING AND
ZONING 153 (1961); Green, Are "Special Use" Procedures in Trouble?, 12 ZoNING
DIGEST 73 (1960).
71. Other motives may predominate. An extreme example is presented in
Cassell v. Lexington Township Bd. of Appeals, 163 Ohio St. 340, 127 N.E.2d 11
(1955). A rural township divided itself into 36 zones, corresponding with the 36
government survey sections. An ordinance permitted farming, residential, com-
mercial and recreational uses in the zoned area, but did not specify where. An
accompanying resolution provided that any permanent structure had to have the
permission of the zoning commission and the township trustees. No standards
were provided. In this case, the applicant wanted to build homes costing about
$10,000 in an area where homes cost from $15,000 to $40,000. He was refused.
The court held the ordinance invalid in the absence of a comprehensive plan.
For an adverse reaction to stopgap ordinances in developed communities see
Bowman v. Board of Councilmen, 303 Ky. 1, 196 S.W.2d 730 (1946); State ex rel.
Ohio Oil Co. v. City of Defiance, 99 Ohio App. 398, 133 N.E.2d 392 (1955). And
for other cases in which the courts reacted adversely to attempts to abuse the
special exception power to protect a rural area see Saddle River Country Day
School v. Saddle River, 51 N.J. Super. 589, 144 A.2d 425 (App. Div. 1958), aff'd,
29 N.J. 468, 150 A.2d 34 (1959); Appeal of Gage, 47 Del. 36 (Pa. C.P. 1959),
a'd, 402 Pa. 244, 167 A.2d 292 (1961).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1963/iss1/4
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
plored. The general nature of the discretionary zoning ordinance
must first be delineated, and this kind of regulation will be found to
have the following characteristics:
1) Either the design or the location of major land uses is left to
the decision of the administrative agency, following an application
by the developer. Sometimes both design and location are subject to
administrative decision. In this manner, the basic decisions about
land use are left to the agency on the basis of individual applications
rather than to the ordinance on the basis of predetermined districts.
2) The exercise of discretionary controls may be confined to the
development of large tracts. And if the discretionary provisions are
made applicable to smaller areas, they are usually intended for tracts
that have not been subdivided in the conventional manner.
3) The method of administration may be mixed. As the more
fundamental land-use decisions are brought under administrative con-
trol, the policy content of the administrative decision increases. For
this reason, the municipality may be reluctant to place these ad-
ministrative functions with the board of adjustment in the form of the
usual special exception. The amendment process may be used, and
the decision-making function may be placed with the governing body.
In other instances the function may be given to the plan commission,
which may make the final determination or which may merely recom-
mend a decision to the city or village council.
A combination of factors makes the use of discretionary administra-
tive controls risky from the constitutional aspect. To the extent that
decisions about the use of large tracts are left to administrative deci-
sion, the courts may find that a legislative policy question has been
unconstitutionally delegated. The difficulties with use variances are
instructive at this point. The use of mixed administrative forms also
has its risks. When the discretionary power to decide on land uses
has been delegated to the plan commission, the ordinance has some-
times been held ultra vires on the ground that the plan commission
has been delegated no such power under the zoning enabling act.72
Under the standard zoning enabling act, which has served as the
model in most states, only the board of adjustment has been given the
dispensing function.
72. Coolidge v. Planning Bd., 337 Mass. 648, 151 N.E.2d 51 (1958); Swimming
River Golf & Country Club v. Burough of New Shrewsbury, 30 N.J. 132, 152 A.2d
135 (1959) ; Saddle River Country Day School v. Saddle River, supra note 71. Cf.
Vulcan Materials Co. v. Griffith, 215 Ga. 811, 818-19, 114 S.E.2d 29, 34-35 (1960)
(dissenting opinion). But cf. Kotrich v. County of Du Page, 19 Ill. 2d 181, 166
N.E.2d 601, appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 475 (1960); Kozesnik v. Montgomery
Township, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957). The New Jersey cases are discussed in
Green, supra note 70.
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Major re-allocations of function have also confused the role of the
governing body. An adverse finding on the ultra vires point can be
avoided if the governing body makes the decision on an application
for development. In this event, however, the delegation question
grows more complicated. Some decisions 73 have characterized the
governing body's function in this situation as legislative, an approach
that avoids the delegation of power issue. This point of view is par-
ticularly strong in New York, where even the prescription of some
standards does not necessarily foreclose the governing body from con-
sidering other factors that are not specified.74 But in other states the
governing body has been held to act administratively when it is given
the dispensing power under a zoning ordinance, so that the exercise of
its discretion must be bounded by standards just as if it were an
administrative body.7 5
Often the cases assume that the constitutional problem is solved
by the characterization adopted, no doubt on the basis that legislative
decisions are free of the delegation of power objection. These deci-
sions forget the spot zoning and Gorieb cases, and their teaching that
the underlying test of arbitrary decision-making cuts across both
legislative and administrative dispensation in zoning practice.7 6
73. Economy Wholesale Co. v. Rodgers, 232 Ark. 835, 340 S.W.2d 583 (1960);
Kotrich v. County of Du Page, supra note 72; Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9
Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956); Marquis v. City of Waterloo, 210 Iowa 439,
228 N.W. 870 (1930); Kramer v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 166 Md.
324, 171 Atl. 70 (1934); Green Point Say. Bank v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 281
N.Y. 534, 24 N.E.2d 319 (1939), appeal dismissed, 309 U.S. 633 (1940) ; Cohen v.
Incorporated Village of Valley Stream, 23 Misc. 2d 1017, 189 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup.
Ct. 1959); Olp v. Town of Brighton, 173 Misc. 1079, 19 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Sup. Ct.
1940), aff'd, 262 App. Div. 944, 29 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1941). This problem has fre-
quently been raised under the more traditional exception provisions.
74. See 4M Club, Inc. v. Andrews, 11 App. Div. 2d 720, 204 N.Y.S.2d 610
(1960). But cf. Zelazny v. Town Bd., 101 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
75. Wheeler v. Gregg, 90 Cal. App. 2d 348, 203 P.2d 37 (1949); City of Miami
Beach v. State ex rel. Ross, 141 Fla. 407, 193 So. 543 (1940) (semble) ; Gaudet v.
Economical Super Market, Inc., 237 La. 1082, 112 So. 2d 720 (1959) ; McCauley v.
Albert E. Briede & Son, 231 La. 36, 90 So. 2d 78 (1956); Building Comm'r of
Medford v. C. & H. Co., 319 Mass. 273, 65 N.E.2d 537 (1946) (point assumed);
Osius v. City of St. Clair Shores, 344 Mich. 693, 75 N.W.2d 25 (1956); State ex
rel. Ludlow v. Guffey, 306 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. 1957); City of Winchester v. Glover,
199 Va. 70, 97 S.E.2d 661 (1957) (filling station permit). Cf. Johnston v. Board
of Supervisors, 31 Cal. 2d 66, 187 P.2d 686 (1947). And see Dallstream & Hunt,
supra note 22, at 222-27.
76. In Wicker Apartments v. City of Richmond, 199 Va. 263, 99 S.E.2d 656
(1957), the exception provision of the zoning ordinance authorized the board of
zoning appeals to permit federal, state or local government buildings in any
district. The board was to be guided by the usual general welfare and related
standards. In this case the board had authorized a municipal juvenile detention
home in a single-family dwelling district. To the objection that the board had
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This point is made dramatically in Friedland v. City of Hollywood."
After the board of adjustment refused to grant a variance for a filling
station, the governing body passed an amendment to the ordinance
under which the station would be a permitted use. Ordinarily, the
court said, a legislative rezoning must be upheld if it can be supported
under the fairly debatable rule. But the court recognized the amend-
ment as a legislative substitution for an administrative judgment.
They treated the legislative rezoning as a "variance," and threw it out
because it made a change in the use classification, a policy decision
which they found not allowable under the variance power.
The Florida court is correct in suggesting that zoning amendments
are often substitutes for administrative dispensation. It is also correct
in suggesting that function is the critical test rather than the charac-
terization given to the agency possessing the deciding power. It lacks
imagination only in failing to see that the basic problem is the ar-
bitrary decision, and that a zoning amendment is equally subject to
challenge for arbitrariness under the spot zoning approach.
A. Analogies to Discretionary Administration
Discretionary administration is the rule rather than the exception
in the English system of land-use planning. Under the
English system, the land-use document, called a development plan,
is not binding. All development of land requires planning permission
from the local authority.75 When planning permission is requested, the
planning authority is directed by statute to exercise its discretion, and
to consider the land use plan and "any other material considerations."
How an English-type delegation would fare before the American
courts is open to question. An intriguing lead is provided by the
Maryland case of Baltimore County v. Missouri Realty, Inc.,1D which
passed on an unusual method of zoning administration. An admini-
strative official, the zoning commissioner of Baltimore County, was
given the power under special state enabling legislation to make
changes in the boundaries of use districts. No standards were pro-
authorized a legislative change in use beyond its powers, the court answered that
the property was owned by the city, and that the council could rezone to permit
the use of its own property contrary to the terms of the ordinance. Any error in
judgment, in a political or any other capacity, would fall on it. But the courts will
hold the municipality to its own ordinance if the function for which the amend-
ment is sought is proprietary. In addition, the municipality may not authorize a
nuisance. Comment, 39 TExAs L. REV. 316, 317-22 (1961).
77. 130 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1961).
78. The English planning control system is described in MANDELKER, GREEN
BELTS AND URBAN GRowTH: ENGLISH TOWN AND CnUNTRY PLANNING IN ACTION
11-23 (1962).
79. 219 Md. 155, 148 A.2d 424 (1959).
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vided, but the boundary change was not to be final without the ap-
proval of the county council. 80 This arrangement was affirmed by the
court over objections that legislative power had been delegated.
Review by the governing body might have obviated the need for
standards. But the court, without discussing this point, found suf-
ficient standards in the preamble to the statute, which set out the
usual prerequisites to the exercise of the zoning function.
The statute was also affirmed on another basis.81 At the local level,
the court held, the problem is one of vires, not constitutionality. The
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers does not apply, and the
only question is whether a power has been conferred, be it called
legislative or administrative, to make a choice of alternatives. While
the vires analysis of the Baltimore County case is not conventional,
this approach is sound as local government law since many courts do
not apply the separation of powers doctrine at the local level82 A
wide reading of this decision would give to state legislatures the op-
portunity to fashion zoning administration in any of a variety of ways
without inhibition by delegation dogma.
Another interesting line of cases is in point with the possible
American reception of the English scheme. They deal with early
pre-zoning ordinances which gave to municipal authorities a blanket
control over new construction. The prototype for this kind of ordi-
nance was the old fire district regulation, which prohibited the
construction of frame buildings in the central business area without
a permit. These ordinances were usually upheld.8 3 As a next step the
ordinance might require, apart from the fire regulations, that a permit
80. In addition, the statute sets up a complicated review procedure. Denials of
a boundary change by the zoning commissioner are appealable to a board of ap-
peals, which may reverse him. In this event, the change must also be approved by
the county council. In the Bactimore County case the court decided that when a
zoning change has been granted by the zoning commissioner, and affirmed by the
board of appeal, it need not be approved by the county council if the board's
action has been affirmed by judicial review. The provisions of the statute are more
fully set out in County Council v. Egerton Realty, Inc., 217 Md. 234, 140 A.2d 510
(1958).
81. The court also noted that a change in boundaries would have to be based,
like an amendment, on original error or on changed circumstances. It also relied
on the available safeguard of judicial review, and on the point that liberal delega-
tions were necessary in administrative law. Besides, it thought, the comprehensive
plan would promote stability and prevent changes that were ill-considered. While
the court noted that the power to make boundary changes was contained in a
special act of the legislature, it indicated that its answer would have been the
same even if this power had been redelegated by an ordinance of the governing
body.
82. Note, 18 IND. L.J. 146, 147 (1943). What the court says about separation
can be applied to delegation of power.
83. Cf. City of Monticello v. Bates, 169 Ky. 258, 183 S.W. 555 (1916).
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had to be obtained for any non-residential building, with no standards
given to guide municipal discretion. Here, at the threshold of the
zoning movement, is an administrative analogue in many ways similar
to the contemporary English model.
Most of the cases that passed on these early permit ordinances held
them unconstitutional, 4 a judicial fact of life that no doubt con-
tributed to the decision to approach zoning on a district basis. Yet
there were contrary decisions,8 5 and a significant point overlooked in
the Maryland litigation over early zoning in Baltimore is the fact that
the ordinance, which was eventually upheld, did not contain a true
variance provision at all. It was more like the English model, and
provided that no building could be erected and no use changed with-
out an administrative permit.86 While the standards in the ordinance
approximated variance standards, the critical point is that the city
had not been zoned into districts and that the permit process was to
function as a substitute.8 7 This history has been forgotten as drafts-
84. E.g., Ingham v. Brooks, 95 Conn. 317, 111 Atl. 209 (1920) ; Continental Oil
Co. v. City of Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89, 286 Pac. 353 (1930); Board of Trustees
v. Bayne, 206 Ky. 68, 266 S.W. 885 (1924) (appears to be fire and health regula-
tion setting up standards governing construction); City of Monticello v. Bates,
169 Ky. 258, 183 S.W. 555 (1916); State ex Tel. Dickson v. Harrison, 161 La. 218,
108 So. 421 (1926); State ex rel. Dickason v. Harris, 158 La. 974, 105 So. 33
(1925); Village of Granville v. Krause, 131 Misc. 752, 228 N.Y. Supp. 204 (Sup.
Ct. 1928) (ordinance based on privately-prepared plan); Gulf Refining Co. v. City
of Dallas, 10 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Spann v. City of Dallas, 111
Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513 (1921).
85. Herring v. Stannus, 169 Ark. 244, 275 S.W. 321 (1924) ; Marquis v. City of
Waterloo, 210 Iowa 439, 228 N.W. 870 (1930) ; Tighe v. Osborne, 150 Md. 452, 133
Atl. 465 (1926); Tighe v. Osborne, 149 Md. 349, 131 Atl. 801 (1925). The Iowa
case upheld a unique statute, apparently still being used, which authorizes
restricted residential districts to be set up on petition by residents, and then
prohibits any but residential uses in these districts except on a permit from the
city council. In a sense, the statute heralds the floating zone technique, now used
in fringe residential areas. More probably, it was an attempt to give legislative
sanction to the kind of protection customarily afforded by the courts under
nuisance law. See Mandelker, Prolonging the Nonconforming Use: Judicial
Restriction of the Power to Zone in Iowa, 8 DaAKE L. Rav. 23 (1958).
86. Four days after the Baltimore city zoning ordinance was held unconstitu-
tional, it was amended to remove the "general welfare" standard that had been
held insufficient by the court. However, the ordinance retained other standards
to guide the issuance of a permit. These were similar to those found in modern
variance and exception provisions, and required consideration of the character of
the building and of the area in which it was to be located. The amended ordinance
was upheld. See the case cited in note 85, supra.
87. For other recent cases which look favorably on techniques related to the
English model see Barkmann v. Town of Hempstead, 268 App. Div. 785, 49
N.Y.S.2d 262 (1944), aff'd, 294 N.Y. 805, 62 N.E.2d 238 (1945) (special permits
for keeping pigeons in "undeveloped sections of the town"); Roney v. Board of
Supervisors, 138 Cal. App. 2d 740, 292 P.2d 529 (1956). In Roney, the applicant
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men, faced with the complexities of modern urban development, have
once more turned to discretionary forms of administration.
B. Judicia Treatment of Discretionary Administration
Very few courts have yet had an opportunity to pass on the more
modern varieties of discretionary administration in zoning ordinances.
The courts that have done so have shown an understandable confusion
in view of the mixture of function that often occurs, and as a result,
the fundamental issue of arbitrary power is sometimes forgotten.
Three types of discretionary devices that are in common use have now
received some amount of judicial construction.
1. Sinking Zones
Hiscox v. Levine,88 a New York trial court case, deals with a
discretionary technique directed toward problems of design. Resi-
dential subdivisions have presented design problems under existing
regulations. Uniform lot dimension and bulk regulations-the so-
called "cookie cutter" approach-have produced monotony and lack of
variety in residential building. New techniques of residential develop-
ment promise to alter these patterns. One innovation, for example, is
the building of residential development at somewhat higher densities,
combined with areas of common open space.89 In this manner, average
densities are maintained throughout the subdivision, but the resulting
open space is more usable, and the whole development generates more
interest.
A technique called the planned development district" has been
devised to handle these and other innovations in residential design.91
wanted to subdivide his land for residential purposes in an industrial district. In
this district, permits were required for other than industrial uses, and new
subdivisions were to be considered in relation to the master plan. This was held
to be a sufficient guide. Compare McCombs v. Larson, 176 Cal. App. 2d 105, 1
Cal. Rptr. 140 (1959). The ordinance required that all lot splits conform to
"such policies" as might be established by the plan commission. The court killed
the effectiveness of the ordinance on a constructional point, but suggested that
the standards were invalid on delegation grounds.
88. 31 Misc. 2d 151, 216 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
89. Urban Land Institute, Tech. Bull. No. 40, New Approaches to Residential
Land Development: A Study of Concepts and Innovations (1961).
90. See Goldston & Scheuer, Zoning of Planned Residential Developments, 73
HARv. L. Rav. 241 (1959).
91. Another point to be made is that planned development district provisions
usually cover developments which contemplate the splitting of the project into
multiple ownerships. This is true, for example, of residential subdivisions in
which the developer intends to convey his houses to the residents as they are
built. Multiple ownership of separate parcels complicates the problems of design,
to which the planned development district provisions are essentially directed.
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One variant of the planned development district is the so-called
"sinking zone." Bulk and density regulations are prescribed as usual,
but the plan commission or the board of adjustment is given the
power to vary these regulations for individual lots, provided average
residential densities are maintained throughout the tract. This type of
provision is very close to the traditional variance or exception, inas-
much as it provides an upper limit from which the administrative
agency is permitted to depart under carefully prescribed circum-
stances. For this reason, sinking zones ought to present few constitu-
tional problems. Indeed, it would be difficult to classify the sinking
zone as an example of discretionary administration were it not for
the fact that the range of discretion afforded permits the substantial
redesign of large areas, as compared with the relatively limited
changes over smaller areas that are permitted by the typical variance
provision.2
The Hiscox case arose under a New York statute. It authorizes a
town plan commission, when approving subdivision plats, to make
"reasonable changes" in the applicable zoning regulations, provided
that average densities are not raised, and provided that the use of
adjoining land and the "public welfare" is safeguarded. 3 The court
held that the standards used in the ordinance were sufficient, but
struck down the application of the ordinance to the particular sub-
division in a manner which severely limits its usefulness. Out of 100
acres of land in a one-acre residential zone, 37 were to be donated as
a park and the rest was to be changed to half-acre zoning. Because the
area covered was so substantial, the court found that the change was
"legislative," and thus an encroachment on the authority of the town's
governing body.94
92. See the discussion of Schoepple v. Township of Woodbridge, 60 N.J. Super.
146, 158 A.2d 338 (App. Div. 1960), in note 40, supra.
93. N.Y. TowN LAw § 281. The relevant provisions of the statute are as
follows: The town board (governing body) is authorized to empower the planning
board (plan commission) "simultaneously with the approval" of a plan either to
"confirm" the zoning regulations "or to make any reasonable change therein." The
owner of the platted land "may submit" a building plan which shall show "maxi-
mum density of population" and minimum yard requirements. If approved by the
planning board, the building plan shall modify the zoning regulations, "provided
that for such land so shown there shall not be a greater average density of pop-
ulation or cover of the land with buildings than is permitted in the district wherein
such lands lie." The building plan shall not be approved unless in the judgment
of the planning board "the appropriate use of adjoining land is reasonably safe-
guarded and such plan is consistent with the public welfare." More explicit
draftsmanship might have clarified the legislative purpose.
94. Furthermore, when calculating the average density of the district "wherein
such lands lie" the court excluded the park, and thus found quite naturally that
the change from one-acre to half-acre zoning had increased densities. However,
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Of course, use changes under variance and exception provisions
have sometimes been overturned on appeal. But when no use change
is required, as in the Hiscox case, the objection is harder to see. The
statute obviously contemplated that adjustments in density might have
to be made over a wide area. Indeed, the introduction of variety con-
sistent with the maintenance of average densities is possible only if
the developer has a large tract with which to work. The courts have
often reacted negatively, however, when land-use decisions about large
tracts have been relegated to the administrative process.95
2. Floating Exceptions
Some land uses that do not easily fit into the more conventional
zone categories are now treated under more flexible administrative
techniques not conformable to the usual pattern. Garden apartments
are one example. When zoning ordinances were first enacted, apart-
ments were often several-story structures built to the edges of small,
standard-sized city lots. High-density coverage, with little or no
open space, led to their segregation from single-family residential
areas. Garden apartments, by way of contrast, are built at lower
densities and may incorporate substantial park areas and other open
spaces. These characteristics, combined with the use of low-rise
structures and adequate landscaping, make the garden apartment
more compatible with single-family residential development.
Existing methods of handling garden apartments and other non-
residential uses with high site values, have not proved adequate.
Prezoning might be effective if planning authorities had more com-
pulsive powers to bring about development in places where it was
desirable, but prezoning merely confers monopoly value on a limited
number of selected sites. Builders for this reason may be unwilling to
the statute intended that the donation of the park as open space was meant to
offset the increase in density in the remaining area. But the statutory language
is far from clear.
Under the facts in the Hiscox case, densities would appear to have been in-
creased even though the park area is included. But the developer claimed that
this was not true.
95. Another potential difficulty with planned development districts is illustrated
by Pierson Trapp Co. v. Peak, 340 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1960). A developer seeking a
change in zoning classification to allow a shopping center had to submit a detailed
development plan. The plan had to cover financial feasibility, site adequacy,
traffic problems and design. In this case, an amendment for a shopping center had
been granted although the developer had not submitted the required plan. Never-
theless, the amendment was upheld. The court found that the ordinance uncon-
stitutionally singled out shopping centers for discriminatory treatment, as de-
velopers proposing amendments for other commercial uses would not have to
submit a development plan. This objection could be overcome by careful drafting.
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buy at inflated prices, and the planning authority has no way to com-
pel a sale at what would be fair terms. If garden apartments and
similar uses are permitted as an excepted use in several districts, a
fair amount of flexibility in ordering their location may be achieved.20
But boards of adjustment have not proved amenable to advice-giving
by professional planning staffs, so that this approach has its limita-
tions. Besides, if the excepted use is permissible in a wide range of
zones, the board of adjustment will have been given the equivalent
of the amending power.
Another approach adapts the amendment process in order to involve
the plan commission, and presumably the professional advice available
from its planning staff. Because it permits, anywhere in the com-
munity, a use that is. usually handled as an exception, this technique
has provisionally been termed a floating exception. An ordinance of
this kind was considered in Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown,97 a lead-
ing New York case.
Under this ordinance, multiple dwellings for fifteen or fewer
families were permitted anywhere in the village, following an applica-
tion by the developer and its approval in the form of an amendment to
the zoning map. The village plan commission was the approving
authority, with the village governing body having the power to over-
rule the plan commission should it withhold its consent. In this case,
for reasons not explained, approval was given both by the plan
commission and the governing body. No standards controlled the
decision to give or to withhold approval, although a minimum plot
size of ten acres was required, and strict standards governing physical
design and layout were imposed. For example, only fifteen per cent of
the ground area could be covered by buildings. In view of the com-
plexity of the ordinance, the nature of the decision on the application
96. An ordinance of this type was upheld in LaRue v. Township of East Bruns-
wick, 68 N.J. Super. 435, 172 A.2d 691 (App. 1961). An amendment to the zoning
ordinance permitted apartments in five of the township's eleven zoning districts.
The apartments were allowable by the board of adjustment under a typical set
of multiple standards, which required consideration of the suitability of the
apartment for the area in which it was to be located, advantage to the community,
proximity to community facilities and similar factors. The court rejected the
argument that the apartments were a "floating use" on the ground that they were
only allowable in certain specified districts. It upheld the ordinance provision as
a special exception and found the standards adequate.
.97. 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951). Approved in Recent Cases, 65 HAMW.
L. REv. 1467 (1952). Criticized in Recent Cases, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 467 (1951).
Similar procedures have been approved under the Iowa restricted residential
district statute. Hirsch v. City of Musactine, 233 Iowa 590, 10 N.W.2d 71 (1943) ;
Marquis v. City of Waterloo, 210 Iowa 439, 228 N.W. 870 (1930). See note 85
supra. Cf. State ex el. Srigley v. Woodworth, 33 Ohio App. 406, 169 N.E. 713
(1929).
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for approval is difficult to characterize as legislative or administrative,
particularly when the governing body gives its approval in a case in
which it is not required.
Over a dissent, the ordinance was upheld by the court of appeals
in a decision that reflects the mixture of legislative and administrative
processes. Of course, the absence of standards would ordinarily have
been fatal had the court treated the decision as administrative. But
the majority opinion appeared to treat the decision to allow the
project as a legislative amendment to the zoning ordinance, and of-
fered no comment on the departure from the prescribed procedure.
The change in use was not spot zoning because it was in accordance
with a comprehensive plan. It was not a variance because the variance
process was not used. Finally, the ordinance was not invalid on the
ground that the boundaries of the multiple-dwelling district were not
fixed in advance. Having fixed the specifications for the new district,
the village need not fix its boundaries. This last comment is confus-
ing; if the approving action is truly legislative, no "specifications" for
the district should have been needed. Similar ordinances have been
upheld in Connecticut. 8
The dissenting opinion held that the procedures provided by the
ordinance improperly bypassed the customary variance requirements,
and had the effect of allowing a variance in a case in which hardship
could not have been proved. In addition, the dissent was worried that
the floating character of the district would create uncertanty, since a
property owner would have no way of knowing whether a multiple-
family dwelling would be located in his district. To this extent, the
ordinance was apparently considered to be arbitrary.
Nevertheless, the distinction between locating the multiple-dwelling
as an excepted use allowable in enumerated districts, and letting it float
until located by administrative or legislative decision is one of degree.
Either technique creates uncertainty until the decision to authorize
the use has been made. Under the Tarrytown-type ordinance the
community has zoned in as much detail as can realistically be expected.
What is left for decision is the hard-to-handle multiple-dwelling use,
98. Summ v. Zoning Comm'n, 186 A.2d 160 (Conn. 1962); De Meo v. Zoning
Comm'n, 148 Conn. 68, 167 A.2d 454 (1961) (apartments); Clark v. Town
Council, 145 Conn. 476, 144 A.2d 327 (1958) (shopping center). In the Clark
case, the development had been allowed under a provision authorizing large-tract
developments on approval of the plan commission. In this town, however, the town
council sat as the plan commission. The court first found no invalid delegation of
legislative power on the ground that the ordinance standards were sufficient. But
it then had to meet an argument which appeared to assert that the ordinance
improperly authorized use changes by administrative decision. To this objection
the court replied that the ordinance merely authorized a legislative change in
zone. If this is true, of course, no standards should have been necessary.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1963/iss1/4
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
which occupies a position secondary to the basic single-family resi-
dential use that has already been placed on the zoning map.09 As the
majority opinion noted, a zoning amendment that is arbitrary can al-
ways be struck down as spot zoning.00 Yet the Tarrytown case might
easily have gone the other way on more conventional grounds. 0 1
3. Floating Zones
Hiscox v. Levine's2 disapproved the use of a discretionary zoning
technique to vary residential densities over a large tract. Rodgers v.
Village of Tarrytown'0 3 approved an even less conventional adaptation
of the amendment process, which delegated the decision to locate size-
able multiple-dwelling projects to the plan commission and governing
council on a case-by-case basis. Discretionary administrative tech-
niques have been used for even more basic land-use location decisions
in communities on the outer fringes of urban areas. In these instances
99. A transitional case which underlines this point is Huff v. Board of Zoning
Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957). When Baltimore County was entirely
rezoned, the ordinance created a "reservoir" district in which residential lot sizes
approaching one acre were required. Light manufacturing could be located in
these districts upon petition to the zoning commissioner, with an appeal to the
board of zoning appeals. Typical standards were provided, requiring attention
to the effects on surrounding property and the purposes of the master plan.
The majority sustained the ordinance, citing the Tarrytown case, but analogiz-
ing to the special exception. The dissent relied on those cases, soon to be discussed,
which held floating zones invalid in rural areas. But the majority noted that the
township in question had been "minutely" zoned.
100. In Larkin v. Schwab, 242 N.Y. 330, 151 N.E. 637 (1926), supra note 67,
the New York Court of Appeals had suggested that its ability to set aside
arbitrary decisions would substitute for the lack of standards to guide administra-
tive discretion under a zoning ordinance.
101. Adams v. Zoning Ed. of Review, 86 R.I. 396, 135 A.2d 357 (1957). Under
the ordinance, "group housing" was allowable as an exception in any zone,
provided the board of adjustment found that the "public convenience or welfare"
was being served and that the objectives of the master plan were advanced. Once
the exception was granted, the zoning requirements applicable to "group housing"
could be
varied in a manner that will be in harmony with the character of the
neighborhood, and that will insure a standard of open space no lower than
permitted by this Ordinance and a lot area per family not more than 20%
less than so required by this Ordinance in the zone in which the proposed
group housing is to be located.
Passing the objection that the "group housing" provision was ultra vires the
enabling act, the court held that the change in use in this case was so extensive
that it invaded the legislative power of the governing body. The board of adjust-
ment had authorized a multiple-dwelling use on four acres in a residential zone,
and the court found that this change in use was too substantial to be accomplished
under the power to grant exceptions.
102. 31 Misc. 2d 151, 216 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
103. 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951).
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the courts have also reacted unfavorably to the discretionary ap-
proach, and the mixture of administrative and legislative function has
once more proved difficult to justify.
In a suburban area on the outer fringe, where little development has
yet occurred, prezoning may prove difficult if not unwise. Apart from
possible constitutional objections founded on a prematurity argu-
ment,1 4 the planning authority may not want to straightjacket an
area in which the development pattern cannot yet be ascertained.
Residential subdivisions might be allowable anywhere, but nonresiden-
tial uses such as shopping centers and industrial parks will require
more careful attention. An answer to this problem is the floating
zone ordinance. It differs from the floating exception in that the
community is not really zoned at all. Only the residual residential
use is permitted, and all other basic land-use zones float until they are
located following an application by a developer who seeks a nonresi-
dential classification.
So far, the cases that have passed on the floating zone technique
have held it either ultra vires or unconstitutional. 10 5 Perhaps the most
instructive opinion is found in the case of Rockhill v. Chesterfield
Township. 0 6 A fringe township in New Jersey had passed an ordinance
under which agricultural, residential and related uses were permitted
as of right. All other uses, except certain uses which were prohibited,
were allowable as special uses following a recommendation by the
planning commission and approval by the governing body. For ex-
ample, the ordinance allowed "Light industrial uses and other similar
facilities having no adverse effect on surrounding property and
deemed desirable to the general economic well-being of the Township."
Other clauses allowing special uses were similarly drafted.
The supreme court of New Jersey struck down the ordinance. It
first noted that "The constitutional and statutory zoning principle is
territorial division according to the character of the lands and struc-
tures. . . ,,111 Division of the municipality into districts, uniform
104. While it should be discounted as an absolute bar to the prezoning of un-
developed areas, the case of Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222,
15 N.E.2d 587 (1938), still poses some problems. Compare Appeal of Lord, 368
Pa. 121, 81 A.2d 533 (1951). See also Reps, The Zoning of Undeveloped Areas,
3 SYRACUSE L. REV. 292 (1952).
105. Rockhill v. Chesterfield Township, 23 N.J. 117, 128 A.2d 473 (1957)
(application to plan commission, which makes recommendation to governing
body); Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960)
(application to governing body); Andrews v. Board of Adjustment, 200 Va. 637,
107 S.E.2d 445 (1959) (application to board of appeals); Town of Hobart v.
Collier, 3 Wis. 2d 182, 87 N.W.2d 868 (1958) (application to governing body).
106. 23 N.J. 117, 128 A.2d 473 (1957).
107. Id. at 125, 128 A.2d at 478.
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treatment of land uses within the districts and the requirement of
zoning in accordance with a comprehensive plan have as their purpose
the prevention of "arbitrary discrimination at war with the substance
of due process and the equal protection of the laws."108 Referring to
the standards that governed the authority to grant special uses, in-
cluding the standards for light industrial uses quoted above, the court
noted that these were:
... terms hardly adequate to channel local administrative discre-
tion but, at all events making for the "piecemeal" and "spot" zon-
ing alien to the constitutional and statutory principle of land use
zoning by districts and comprehensive planning for the fulfillment
of the declared policy.109
The convergence of theory in the Rockhil case is enlightening, and
other courts that have passed on floating zones have taken substan-
tially the same position.11 ° What clearly concerned the New Jersey
court was the administrative opportunity to make an arbitrary deci-
sion, and they sought an anchor against it both in the physical separa-
tion of land uses within the community and in the language of delega-
tion. In terms of function, however, there is little difference between
the floating zone and the more conventional special exception. Both
provide a means for administratively locating land uses within the
framework of the zoning ordinance and the land use map. Although
the standards of delegation in special exception provisions are equally
vague, the New Jersey court has had no difficulty upholding special
exceptions of the usual variety.
What may have been decisive in the Rockhill case is the quantitative
element. Under the conventional zoning ordinance, all of the basic
land uses are physically assigned to districts, and the uses that are
subject to administrative location are quantitatively small. But under
108. Id. at 126, 128 A.2d at 478.
109. Id. at 127, 128 A.2d at 479.
110. Cf. Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957),
discussed in note 99, supra; Town of Granby v. Landry, 341 Mass. 443, 170
N.E.2d 364 (1960), upholding a zoning ordinance which simply prohibited more
than one house trailer on any one parcel of land. The court held that the division
of the town into districts was not essential under the zoning enabling act.
For an interesting analysis of the policy-making and policy-applying functions
in zoning see State ex Tel. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 45 Wash. 2d 492, 275 P.2d
899 (1954). The city attempted to rezone a site from business to agriculture to
prevent its use for off-street parking. The court threw out the amendment. It
noted that the policy of the ordinance is set when it is adopted, and cannot be
inquired into when a permit is sought. Zones cannot be changed to block a use
that complies with the zonal requirement. The opinion would appear to favor the
predetermination of individual uses. Cf. Kotrich v. County of Du Page, 19 Ill.
2d 181, 166 N.E.2d 601 (1960) (suggesting that unlimited application of the
special exception technique would undermine the ordinance).
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the floating zone technique only the technique only the residual agri-
cultural and residential uses are permitted as of right; the commercial
and industrial uses float, and quantitatively their geographic impact
may be considerable. Once more, an analogy to the big and little apart-
ments of the Indiana variance cases may be helpful.
Floating zones characterize the administrative muddle which has
come to be characteristic of present-day zoning. The courts object to
a failure to provide a full range of districts, a patternizing thought to
be capable of preventing the arbitrary decision in the individual case.
But it was this very division into districts that created the admin-
istrative problem in the first place. And so the circle does a full turn.
CONCLUSION
If there is any consistency to the decisions on delegation, it is in
judicial resistance to any administrative device that leaves the policy
decision to the administrator rather than to the ordinance. This
tendency explains judicial opposition to the use variance and to float-
ing zones. While the use exception cases which accept vague delega-
tions would not seem to fit this generalization, they can be explained
by the fact that the ordinance limits the excepted use to designated
districts. The decisions thus echo the common statutory injunction,
that zoning must be accomplished "in accordance with a comprehen-
sive plan." A common element in the ordinances thrown out for lack
of standards is the absence of a rule sufficiently precise to forestall
the arbitrary decision that the comprehensive plan requirement seeks
to prevent.
Mere language cannot provide the stabilizing element, however. The
usual language of delegation is meaningless, because zoning policy
must be expressed by the way in which the ordinance organizes the
physical environment. In turn, this process requires a series of deci-
sions about the location of individual uses, and these decisions cannot
be translated into abstract language meant to govern administrative
decisions. For example, an ordinance might locate a residential dis-
trict on a map and then leave the placing of garden apartments within
that district to the plan commission under standards addressed to
community well-being and general welfare. The incongruity of this
solution is apparent, because general welfare standards cannot begin
to express the details that would have to be taken into account when
the plan commission makes a decision about location. Yet any more
detailed elaboration of the general welfare standard would be hard to
devise. It would have to isolate the factors necessary to the successful
location of land uses, and so would give away the fact that the ad-
ministrative body is really asked to do the job of planning.
As a result, unfavorable judicial decisions on zoning standards
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could not be expected to bring about the drafting of more articulate
guides. This conclusion is reinforced by an informal survey, conducted
by this writer, of communities which had an unfavorable court deci-
sion on delegation in recent years. 1' In a few cases more precise
standards were drafted. More commonly, the decision was ignored on
one ground or another, or the community wrote around it by drafting
a substantive provision directed specifically at the problem giving
rise to the litigation.
What is immediately striking about the American zoning pattern
is that the exercise of administrative discretion under the ordinance
was conceived as a tangential rather than as an integral phase in
'administration. As the ordinance was intended to solve most land-use
problems in advance, the use of the dispensing power was considered
to be exceptional rather than expected. As a result, too much of a
policy load is placed on the ordinance, a burden which has been solved
by overconcreteness in drawing districts and in elaborating regula-
tions. A board called upon to grant an exception thus gets little of
a guide in the way of general policy from the ordinance, and must rely
on the general directions of the variance and exception provisions.
But most standards in zoning ordinances re-enact the general pur-
poses of the ordinance and the enabling act, rather than establish
criteria for land-use policy.
111. Inquiries were sent to communities in which there had been an unfavorable
decision on zoning standards within the past 15 years. Out of 38 inquiries, 16
replies were received, a fairly representative sample except for the fact that the
bulk of the replies came from Pennsylvania or New Jersey. Of these 16 com-
munities, 11 had written around the unfavorable decision. Usually they enacted
explicit substantive regulations to take care of the problem giving rise to the
decision, but occasionally they enacted more detailed standards which permitted
the zoning agency to make the same decision it made in the first instance.
In three instances the unfavorable decision was ignored, either because the
administrative problem was thought not to come up often enough to deserve
further attention, or because the impact of the decision was dismissed in various
ways. E.g., in one instance it was claimed that the issue had not really been
litigated because the judge had raised it on his own motion. In the remaining
few instances the decision could not be said to have any real impact. For example,
one of these cases had invalidated the shopping center regulations of the ordi-
nance, and the community is presently redrafting the entire provision.
On this point, the subsequent zoning history in Chesterfield Township is
instructive. In Rocikhill v. Chesterfield Township, discussed in the text supra,
the New Jersey court had invalidated a floating zone ordinance under which the
township was zoned in its entirety for agricultural and residential uses. Every
other use "floated." Subsequently (March 6, 1961), the township was zoned into
districts, but the rural-agricultural zone covers at least 99% of the township.
Single-family residences are permitted in the rural-agricultural zone. Much of
the remaining area is in a single-family residential zone, from which agricultural
uses are excluded. Chesterfield Township, Zoning Ordinance, March 6, 1961.
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ZONING ADMINISTRATION
An adaptation of the English planning scheme has greater promise,
and has already been attempted by those American ordinances that
employ direct discretionary administrative techniques. The English
development plan is decidedly more generalized than the American
zoning ordinance. Zone designations in cities, for example, only in-
dicate the predominant use in an area, and the plan does not attempt
to redefine districts to the lot and block level. Administration of the
plan is carried out under policy statements complementary to the plan.
These are expressed in general terms, and relate to specific areas under
the plan's jurisdiction. An approach could be made to the English
scheme by making the land-use element of the master plan directly
enforceable through administrative controls. A possible model for this
kind of control is the improvement location permit, which is made
available in a few states as a plan-implementing device.
112
Several advantages would flow from such a scheme. The objection
under present ordinances to allowing use changes by administrative
boards is not so much that land-use designations should not be tailored
to individual cases. Rather, the objection is that the change often
works at cross-purposes with an ordinance that was supposed to
make detailed allocations in the first instance. Giving the administra-
tive function a coordinate place in the administration of the ordinance
should lead to a more rational distribution of the policy-making and
policy-applying functions. The English plan has the advantage of
recognizing the policy element that is a part of any administrative
decision. The English system increases the policy content of that
decision by generalizing the development plan guides. But the
administrative decision gains in relevance because the guides fur-
nished by the plan are based on the physical features of the map, and
are mediated as little as possible by words.
More concrete guidance in the application of planning policies can
then be provided through the judicial review function. This is the
significant clue provided by those cases, whether they deal with
amendments or administrative change, that afford a check on decision-
making by reserving the right to overturn arbitrary decisions in
specific instances. The Gorieb, Larkin and Tarrytown opinions are in
this pattern, and in each case an ordinance without standards was
sustained by the court. These courts can set policy for administra-
tion through the supervision of individual appeals, and by judicial
acceptance or rejection of the reasons advanced in support of zoning
changes.
The judicial decisions reveal an underlying uneasiness, which can
be taken as an index of administrative malfunction. Experimental
innovation along the lines indicated is clearly in order.
112. E.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 53-753 (1951). The effect of these suggestions
would be to dispense with the zoning ordinance entirely.
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